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JUDICIAL CONFLICTS AND VOTING 
AGREEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM 
INTERRUPTIONS AT ORAL ARGUMENT 
TONJA JACOBI* 
KYLE ROZEMA** 
Abstract: This Article asks whether observable conflicts between Supreme 
Court justices—interruptions between the justices during oral arguments—can 
predict breakdowns in voting outcomes that occur months later. To answer this 
question, we built a unique dataset based on the transcripts of Supreme Court 
oral arguments and justice votes in cases from 1960 to 2015. We find that on 
average a judicial pair is seven percent less likely to vote together in a case for 
each interruption that occurs between them in the oral argument for that case. 
While a conflict between the justices that leads to both interruptions and a 
breakdown in the voting coalition is one possible explanation of the finding, it 
is not the only one. An interruption by one justice of another justice could in-
stead just reflect something about the case that renders it more prone to disa-
greement, such as being legally or politically salient, or something more idio-
syncratic about the way the individual interrupting justice views the case. We 
set out an empirical strategy that isolates the conflict explanation from these 
and other possible explanations and find that the conflict inherent in interrup-
tions explains over half of the relationship between interruptions and disa-
greement. These findings suggest that oral arguments are important in shaping 
judicial decisions—they are not simply a “dog and pony show”—and that 
there is valuable information about future case outcomes that has not previ-
ously been appreciated. 
INTRODUCTION 
Justice Breyer and the late Justice Scalia had a notoriously contentious 
relationship. They were ideological opponents1 and they were methodologi-
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cal opposites.2 Even when they each broke with ideological expectations, 
they tended to break in opposite directions such that they still did not vote 
together.3 Perhaps it is unsurprising, then, that they often interrupted each 
other during oral arguments. In a major study of justice interruptions at oral 
arguments published in 2017, Tonja Jacobi and Dylan Schweers found that 
Justice Breyer interrupted Justice Scalia twice as often as any other justice 
interrupted another justice, with one exception: Justice Scalia interrupted 
                                                                                                                           
1 Justice Scalia was approximately as conservative as Justice Breyer is liberal. Andrew D. 
Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for 
the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 146 (2002) [hereinafter Martin & 
Quinn, Martin-Quinn Scores] (underlying data available at Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, 
Martin-Quinn Scores, U. MICH., http://mqscores.lsa.umich.edu/measures.php). The most com-
monly used contemporary measure of judicial ideology puts justices on a scale that historically 
ranges from a liberal extreme of -7.75 (Justice Douglas in 1975) to the conservative extreme of 
4.51 (then-Justice Rehnquist, also in 1975). See Martin & Quinn, Martin-Quinn Scores, supra. 
Justice Scalia, with an average score of 2.47, was more than one standard deviation (2.14) from 
the historical average (-0.06); Justice Breyer measures as more moderate but is still significantly 
liberal, with a score of 1.13, more than half a standard deviation left of center. Id. Calculations are 
made using data available through the University of California at Berkeley. Id. 
 2 Justice Scalia was a formalist, and Justice Breyer is a pragmatist. See Joshua Fischman & 
Tonja Jacobi, The Second Dimension of the Supreme Court, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1671, 1675 
(2016) (showing that Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer are far apart not only in their ideology but 
also in their methodology). Compare ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDER-
AL COURTS AND THE LAW 16–18 (1997) (arguing against use of legislative history in statutory 
interpretation), and ANTONIN SCALIA, ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 43–45 
(2007) (arguing in favor of an originalist interpretation of the Constitution), with STEPHEN BREY-
ER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 17–19, 21, 37 (2005) 
(arguing that enabling democracy should be the guiding theme in interpreting the Constitution and 
favoring the spirit of the document over any specific provision). 
 3 See Fischman & Jacobi, supra note 2, at 1674–75 (showing that cases in which the Court is 
said to have broken along “‘unusual’ coalitions” actually fit a consistent pattern). Consider, for 
example, recent landmark Fourth Amendment cases. See e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 4–6 
(2013) (finding that the special protection of the home renders a dog sniff of the curtilage a search 
requiring probable cause); Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465 (2013) (finding that taking and 
analyzing a cheek swab of a lawfully arrested suspect’s DNA is a reasonable police booking pro-
cedure). In Jardines, Justice Breyer joined the conservative Justice Alito’s opinion dissenting from 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, and in King, Justice Scalia dissented, joined by all of the liberal 
justices, Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, except for Justice Breyer, who joined Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 16–26 (Alito, J., dissenting); King, 569 U.S. at 
466–82 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The same pattern also arises in Sixth Amendment right to jury trial 
cases and confrontation clause cases. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 308, 
311 (2009) (prohibiting admission of chemical drug tests without the in-person testimony of the 
scientist who conducted the test); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 361–62 (2008) (prohibiting 
hearsay statements by a murder victim due to unavailability of the witness to testify as a result of 
defendant’s wrongdoing because the murder was not committed in order to prevent the admis-
sion). In Giles, Justice Breyer dissented from Justice Scalia’s majority opinion expanding defend-
ant trial protections. Giles, 554 U.S. at 380–406 (Breyer, J., dissenting). And in Melendez-Diaz, 
Justice Breyer, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Alito joined Justice Kennedy’s opinion dissent-
ing from Justice Scalia’s majority opinion. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 330–57 (Kennedy, J., dis-
senting).  
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Justice Breyer twice as much as Justice Breyer interrupted him.4 This raises 
interesting questions: do justices interrupting each other generally signal 
conflict between the justices? Are other justice-to-justice interruptions pre-
dictive of disagreement between the justices in case votes? In this Article, 
we use novel data on oral arguments and judicial voting from more than 
half a century to investigate whether the relationship between interruptions 
during oral arguments and judicial disagreement in the outcomes of cases is 
confined to the salient example of the Breyer-Scalia feud. We find that it is 
not; our results suggest that oral arguments are not just a “dog and pony 
show,” as some have suggested, but rather have significance for future case 
outcomes.5 
There are several explanations for why justices who interrupt each 
other in a case are less likely to vote together. Our hypothesis is a “conflict” 
theory: interruptions constitute a type of observable conflict that is system-
atically associated with disagreement. The conflict theory is consistent with 
psychology research, which defines interruptions as “deviations from the 
turn-taking rule that specifies that only one party should talk at the time.”6 
While a conflict between justices that leads to both interruptions and a 
breakdown in voting is one possible explanation of the finding, it is not the 
only. We set forth an empirical strategy to isolate the conflict explanation 
from competing explanations. A second “exposure” theory would suggest 
that justices who speak more in a case might be more exposed to interrupt-
ing or being interrupted simply by virtue of taking up more airtime. A third 
“dissatisfaction” theory would suggest that an interrupting justice is inter-
rupting because he or she is at odds with the rest of the Court about the di-
rection of the oral argument and the anticipated outcome of the case. For 
example, this may occur if the case is very salient to the individual justice 
but not necessarily salient to the rest of the Court. A fourth “difficult case” 
theory would suggest that interruptions are simply reflections of something 
about the case generally that is common to all justices, and cases with more 
disagreement are more prone to interruptions. The difference between the 
                                                                                                                           
 4 Tonja Jacobi & Dylan Schweers, Justice, Interrupted: The Effect of Gender, Ideology and 
Seniority at Supreme Court Oral Arguments, 103 VA. L. REV. 1379, 1434 (2017). The 2002 Term 
was also covered in this analysis. Id. at 1382. 
 5 See James C. Phillips & Edward L. Carter, Source of Information or “Dog and Pony 
Show”?: Judicial Information Seeking During U.S. Supreme Court Oral Argument, 1963–1965 & 
2004–2009, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79, 169 (2010) (arguing that the information-seeking value 
of oral arguments has diminished since the 1960s). 
 6 RICHARD J. WATTS, POWER IN FAMILY DISCOURSE 66 (1991) (quoting Geoffrey W. Beat-
tie, Turn-taking and Interruption in Political Interviews: Margaret Thatcher and Jim Callaghan 
Compared and Contrasted, 39 SEMIOTICA 93, 93 (1982)). For a more detailed discussion, see infra 
notes 18–45 and accompanying text. 
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dissatisfaction and difficult case theories is, in the difficult cases, the inter-
ruption is not specific to either of the justices involved in the interruption 
but is simply a response to the nature of the case itself. 
Rather than treating the justices as unique actors or as a single institu-
tion, we model judicial voting as a set of pairwise coalitions and assess 
whether interruptions between pairs of justices are associated with break-
downs in the outcomes of the coalitions (voting against each other).7 Exam-
ining agreement and disagreement through the lens of judicial pairs is apt 
because a case outcome is not simply a product of adding up votes for and 
against a given ruling: doctrine is a product of opinion writing, and opinion 
writing is a product of persuasion.8 Given that the only time that the Su-
preme Court formally meets as a group to discuss cases other than during 
oral argument is at its conference session in which each justice casts his or 
her vote, the canonical persuasive process occurs between pairs of justices, 
where individual justices send notes to the opinion authors and the authors 
respond to each justice individually.9 In this process, case decisions that 
break with expected outcomes might look more like a result of breakdowns 
in relationships between justices than solely the result of individual justice 
behavior. Empirically, this framework allows us to control for differences in 
agreement between every judicial pair. 
We find that on average a judicial pair is seven percent less likely to 
vote together in a case for each interruption that occurs between the justice-
pair in the case at oral argument. This is a substantially and statistically sig-
nificant relationship and provides important information about future judi-
cial voting to anyone witnessing Supreme Court oral arguments. Further-
more, we find evidence to suggest that the conflict inherent in interruptions 
explains over half of the relationship between interruptions and disagree-
ment: even after accounting for reasonable proxies for the exposure, dissat-
isfaction, and difficult case theories of interruptions, we find that the proba-
                                                                                                                           
 7 For discussion of the literature on peer effects, see infra note 80 and accompanying text. 
Importantly, this framework allows us to control for differences in agreement between each and 
every coalition pair. See infra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 8 Assessing outcomes of individuals as a set of pairwise outcomes between individuals (re-
ferred to as paired or dyadic data) is a prevalent way of thinking about social behavior in the net-
works literature. See, e.g., Marco Battaglini & Eleonara Patacchini, Influencing Connected Legis-
lators 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22739, 2016) (studying how legisla-
tors care about the behavior of their friends also in the legislature). It is also a prevalent way of 
thinking about social behavior in the international trade literature. See, e.g., Adam S. Chilton & 
Eric A. Posner, Why Countries Sign Bilateral Labor Agreements 36–37 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for 
Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 807, 2017) (examining what motivates pairs of countries to 
agree to a bilateral trade agreement with one another). 
 9 See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 56–79 (1998) (describing 
the intra-Court persuasion involved in developing Supreme Court opinions). 
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bility that a justice-pair votes together decreases by four percent for each in-
terruption. This evidence strongly supports the conflict theory. Meanwhile, 
we find no evidence for the dissatisfaction theory. We do find evidence for 
both the exposure and difficult case theories, but the effects are less than the 
conflict effect. 
To assess whether this result only arises under certain conditions, we 
explore whether there is heterogeneity in the relationship between interrup-
tions and voting agreement. One potentially important factor is the strength 
of the relationship between justices. An interruption between two justices in 
the first year they work together could indicate something different than an 
interruption in their twentieth year. We find some evidence to suggest that 
interruptions between justices who have served longer are less indicative of 
a conflict between them than are interruptions that occur earlier in the time 
they serve together. Another potentially important factor is party affiliation. 
A conservative justice might interrupt a liberal justice for a different reason 
than he or she interrupts a fellow conservative. We assess the extent that 
breakdowns in judicial coalitions of the same party have a similar effect to 
breakdowns in judicial collations of opposite parties. We find no evidence 
that the negative relationship between interruptions and voting is different 
for justices of the same and opposite parties. We also consider heterogeneity 
in the effect by other justice attributes (such as experience and gender) as 
well as by case attributes (such as the political salience and legal im-
portance of the case). We find that while some of these characteristics are 
significant in their own right in predicting disagreement, there is no evi-
dence that any of them significantly change the relationship between inter-
ruptions and voting. 
We also investigate the relationship between voting agreement and dif-
ferent types of interruptions. Any time two justices speak almost simultane-
ously, the second speaker will technically be interrupting the first. That “in-
terruption,” however, might be unintentional. We consider that short con-
versational overlaps are very different to the situation where one justice is 
speaking for a significant length of time before a second justice begins 
speaking, without waiting for the first justice to finish his or her point. The 
latter scenario is a true interruption, so we call this a “substantive interrup-
tion;” the former scenario is more likely to be an accidental conversational 
overlap than an interruption, so we call this a “conversational overlap.” We 
expect quite different relationships between the two types of interruptions 
and voting agreement. The social science literature on interruptions in other 
2018] Judicial Conflicts and Voting Agreement 2265 
contexts suggests that interruptions can be expressions of power.10 Two in-
dividuals accidentally speaking at almost the same time is a quite different 
phenomenon. 
These two different types of interruption provide us an opportunity to 
conduct robustness checks on our results, to give us some confidence that 
we have identified the conflict inherent in interruptions. Because we expect 
only substantive interruptions to be associated with disagreement, finding 
no relationship between conversational overlaps and voting agreement 
would provide further evidence that we have identified the conflict inherent 
in interruptions. To explore this, we investigate whether interruptions that 
are not expected to contain conflict are nonetheless related to disagreement, 
and find no evidence that conversational overlaps are associated with voting 
disagreement. 
Finally, we test the possibility that the relationship between interrup-
tions and disagreement is driven by a more general conflict between justic-
es, rather than conflict stemming from the specific case in question. In a 
second placebo test, we assess whether interruptions between justices in 
other oral arguments that day or that week predict voting disagreement. We 
find no evidence of a relationship between other interruptions between jus-
tices in that day or week and voting agreement. These results provide fur-
ther evidence that it is the conflict inherent in interruptions that is driving 
the relationship with disagreement and that the conflict between justices is 
limited to the case in question. 
Our study suggests that there has been evidence available about likely 
future votes of Supreme Court justices in plain sight even before the justices 
have voted at conference. The results add to recent evidence suggesting that 
emotional arousal in justices’ voices during oral arguments, as measured by 
their vocal pitch, predicts many of their eventual votes.11 Our study also 
shows that oral arguments can offer evidence of justice interactions beyond 
that found in judicial opinions and the tone of their voice, and directs atten-
tion to interruptions at oral arguments as evidence of inter-justice dynamics. 
It is worth noting, however, that we do not have a robust way to isolate the 
direction of causality. It is possible that interruptions cause disagreement 
among the justices—for example, if there is antipathy produced by a rude 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See infra notes 86–89 and accompanying text. Note that there are competing theories of 
interruptions, but Jacobi and Schweers find that in the Supreme Court context, the strongest evi-
dence is for the dominance hypothesis. See Jacobi & Schweers, supra note 4, at 1400. 
 11 See generally Bryce J. Dietrich, Ryan D. Enos & Maya Sen, Emotional Arousal Predicts 
Voting on the U.S. Supreme Court, POL. ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2018) (showing that caseloads 
can be predicted based on the level of emotional arousal in the justices’ voices during oral argu-
ments). 
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interruption. But it is also possible that disagreement causes interruptions—
for example, if a justice attempts to shut down expression of a view with 
which he or she disagrees. Finally, we discuss possible interpretations of the 
findings under alternative assumptions about the direction of causality and 
argue that the findings suggest that oral arguments are not, at least to the 
justices, merely a form of theatre. 
Part I sets the background.12 It provides illustrations of substantive in-
terruptions and conversational overlaps, outlines the literature that is rele-
vant to our inquiry, and examines why interruptions might be related to ju-
dicial voting disagreement. Part II describes our data, including how we 
define interruptions and how we differentiate substantive interruptions from 
conversational overlaps.13 Part III presents descriptive statistics of interrup-
tions and justice-pair voting patterns.14 First, we assess the extent that inter-
ruptions are related to exposure to being interrupted; second, we describe 
the empirical strategy for assessing coalitions by the justice-pair; and third, 
we assess differences in interruptions and voting by justices and by justice-
pairs. Part IV provides our estimates of the relationship between interrup-
tions and agreements.15 We first investigate whether the relationship is in-
deed negative and significant and then test whether that relationship varies 
by attributes of the justices or attributes of the cases. Part V investigates 
whether substantial interruptions and mere conversational overlaps are 
meaningfully different in terms of predicting voting agreement among the 
justices.16 In Part VI, we present the implications of our analysis, propose 
potential future inquiries, and conclude.17 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Illustrations: Examining the Intent Behind Different  
Types of Interruptions 
This Part provides some examples from Supreme Court cases during 
the Roberts Court to illustrate both substantive interruptions and conversa-
tional overlaps occurring during oral arguments. 
Our aim is to understand the intent of the speaker who interrupts, 
which of course we cannot observe directly. We focus on intent because an 
intentional interruption is one of the clearest signals of some form of con-
                                                                                                                           
 12 See infra notes 18–102 and accompanying text.  
 13 See infra notes 103–115 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 116–120 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 121–133 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 135–148 and accompanying text. 
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flict between justices. Reading between the lines of a given interruption and 
the context in which it was made, we can begin to distinguish between in-
tentional and unintentional interruptions. Through this task, we can infer the 
intention of some interruptions. But the task of empirically classifying thou-
sands of interruptions as either intentional or unintentional is more difficult. 
In order to differentiate intentional interruptions from mere conversational 
overlaps, we have to design a comprehensive definition that can be applied 
objectively and automatically, rather than examining the details of each in-
terruption.18 Here we examine some representative examples. 
In Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, the Supreme Court ad-
dressed whether tribal sovereign immunity prevents a state from suing in 
federal court when activity that violates the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
“takes place outside of Indian lands.”19 The Act permits Indian tribes to op-
erate casinos on Indian lands, under certain conditions; the Michigan Indian 
Land Claims Settlement Act designates lands bought with funds from a 
congressionally established trust as Indian lands.20 The Bay Mills Indian 
Community, a federally recognized Indian tribe located in Michigan, 
opened a casino on lands purchased with funds from that trust. The State 
sued, claiming the Bay Mills casino violated state gaming laws. 
The Court ultimately barred Michigan’s suit on grounds of tribal sov-
ereign immunity. The Court split five to four with Justice Kagan writing for 
the majority, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, 
and Sotomayor, who also wrote a concurring opinion. The Court held that 
Indian tribes retain “inherent sovereign authority” unless and until Congress 
acts to abrogate that sovereignty, and such sovereignty includes immunity 
from suit, including suits brought by states.21 Justices Scalia, Thomas, and 
Ginsburg all wrote dissenting opinions, and each of those Justices, along 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See supra note 113 and accompanying text. In the oral argument transcripts, the Court 
reporters code interruptions with either two dashes at the end of the text for the person being inter-
rupted or at the beginning of the text of the person interrupting (or both). Below, we describe a 
refinement to the definition of the two-dash interruptions in two ways. First, we require the inter-
rupter to speak for more than one second. Second, we require that the person who was interrupted 
to have been speaking for at least one second before the beginning of the next person’s speech 
episode. As we will see in Part I.A, this definition distinguishing substantive interruptions from 
conversational overlaps does not always treat the intentions of interrupters and interruptees in the 
same way, but it is a largely effective categorization. See infra notes 19–45 and accompanying 
text. 
 19 Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2028 (2014). 
 20 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5) (2012) (“Indian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate gaming 
activity on Indian lands if the gaming activity is not specifically prohibited by Federal law and is 
conducted within a State which does not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit 
such gaming activity.”). 
 21 Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2030–31. 
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with Justice Alito, joined Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion. Justice 
Thomas’s dissenting opinion argued that the Court had previously erred in 
extending tribal sovereign immunity to bar suits arising out of the tribe’s 
commercial activities conducted outside tribal lands, as that doctrine consti-
tutes “an affront to state sovereignty” and creates inequities, rendering 
tribes more protected than other sovereigns.22 
The case had judicial voting coalitions that crossed the standard ideo-
logical lines—most notably with Justice Ginsburg joining the three most 
conservative Justices on the Court in dissent.23 Yet even though the case 
outcome was not predictable on ideological lines, the Justices’ behavior at 
oral argument gave hints of the unusual breakdown among the eventual vot-
ing coalitions that was to come. This oral argument provided examples of 
both conversational overlaps and substantive interruptions, and illustrates 
the significance of those distinctions. 
An exchange between Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito provides 
an example of a conversational overlap that should not be given signifi-
cance by being counted as a substantive interruption: 
Samuel A. Alito, Jr.: What remedy-- 
John G. Roberts, Jr.: If we get -- go ahead. 
Samuel A. Alito, Jr.: --What remedy would a private person 
have?24 
Even though Chief Justice Roberts interrupted a Justice with whom he 
ultimately disagreed, their speech episodes occurred in such close proximity 
that this interaction is not the type that one would associate with a signifi-
cant disagreement. The interruption seems unintentional. This is buttressed 
                                                                                                                           
 22 Id. at 2045 (citing Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Tech., 523 U.S. 751 (1998)). 
 23 Id. These coalitions, however, were consistent on methodological lines, with conservative 
and liberal formalists—Justice Scalia and Thomas, and Ginsburg, respectively—dissenting from a 
largely pragmatic coalition. See Fischman & Jacobi, supra note 2, at 1674–75, 1697–98, 1709 
(showing that even in cases that cross ideological lines, consistent methodological patterns arise, 
with Justices Scalia and Ginsburg constituting the formalist end of the spectrum, and Justices 
Kennedy, Breyer, and the Chief Justice making up the most pragmatic end). The examples below, 
however, show that even cases that are inexplicable on both ideological and methodological lines 
can be meaningfully informed by examining interruptions at oral arguments. See infra notes 24–45 
and accompanying text. 
 24 Oral Argument at 44:21, Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. 2024 (No. 12-515), https://www.oyez.org/
cases/2013/12-515. The underlying files from Oyez identify an interruption with the use of either two 
dashes (--) at the end of a speech episode of the speaker being interrupted or two dashes at the begin-
ning of a speech episode of the interrupting speaker, or both. Id. This coding is also used in the offi-
cial transcripts of Supreme Court oral arguments. See, e.g., Oral Argument, Perry v. Merit Sys. Prot. 
Bd., 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017) (No. 16-399), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_
transcript/2016 [http://perma.cc/GZ3H-MNJV]. See infra Part II for information about the Oyez 
Project and the data used in this Article. 
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by the fact that the Chief Justice recognized that he interrupted Justice Alito 
and promptly yielded the floor to him, suggesting the interruption indicated 
no animosity, but rather constituted an incidental overlap. 
Even when a justice recognizes that he or she has interrupted, this does 
not always result in deference to the interruptee. For instance, consider the 
following in the same case: 
Samuel A. Alito, Jr.: Going forward then-- 
Anthony M. Kennedy: Why couldn’t you at least -- I think this is 
Justice Alito’s question. I don’t mean to interrupt. But why 
couldn’t you say that it’s a matter of compact interpretation 
whether these are Indian lands?25 
Justice Kennedy persevered with his question, even having recognized 
that he interrupted Justice Alito, which makes it seem more deliberate than 
Chief Justice Roberts’s interruption above. Justice Alito, however, had only 
spoken four words before being cut off, which only took about one second 
before Justice Kennedy started speaking. As such, Kennedy’s interruption 
may have been unintentional, even if his decision to persevere after realiz-
ing he had interrupted was a deliberate choice. 
We also consider conversational overlaps in terms of how long the in-
terrupting justice speaks. This is illustrated by the interaction between two 
justices who once again ultimately disagreed in the case: 
John G. Roberts, Jr.: They are quasi sovereigns. Which means-- 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Dependent sovereigns. 
John G. Roberts, Jr.: --Dependent sovereigns which is surprising 
that the scope of their immunity exceeds that of States or foreign 
sovereigns.26 
In this instance, the interruption took the form of a correction of the 
Chief Justice, who ultimately sided with the majority, by an ultimately dis-
senting Justice. Nevertheless, we categorize this as a conversational overlap 
because although the interruptee spoke for long enough, the interrupter only 
spoke for less than a second (recall that one condition for an interruption is 
that the interrupter continues to speak for more than a second). This exam-
ple is a nice illustration of how our speaking time-based definition does not 
always treat the intent of interrupters and interruptees in the same way. 
Here, Justice Ginsburg clearly intentionally interrupted Justice Roberts. The 
                                                                                                                           
 25 Oral Argument, Bay Mills, supra note 24, at 15:43. 
 26 Id. at 50:30. 
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interruption, however, was not for the purpose of taking over the conserva-
tion. 
In contrast, other interruptions in the Bay Mills argument are clearly 
substantive. One occurred between the ultimate majority opinion writer and 
one of the dissenting authors: 
Elena Kagan: Well, there seems something sort of strange about 
that, General, because as I read Kiowa, what it was, was an invi-
tation to Congress. It was saying, you know, we have some con-
cerns about this, we’re not sure it makes sense. We are dropping a 
very broad hint that Congress should change it. And 15 years lat-
er, Congress has done nothing. And then to come back 15 years 
later and to say, you know, Congress didn’t really accept our hint, 
so we’ll just do it ourselves and make Congress reverse it, 
wouldn’t you think that that’s a strange procedure to use? 
John J. Bursch: --Actually, Justice Kagan, I think that’s the way 
that the common law works, that the Court does extend invita-
tions to the legislative and executive branches. 
Antonin Scalia: Maybe we’ve learned something in 15 years, 
such as the fact that-- 
Elena Kagan: Or that Congress thought that this did make 
sense.27 
Here, Justice Kagan asked a very probing and challenging question to 
the Solicitor General of Michigan, who she ultimately ruled against. After 
the advocate responded, Justice Scalia made a statement challenging the 
argument implicit in Justice Kagan’s question; Justice Kagan in turn inter-
rupted with a statement to rebut his response. Justice Kagan’s interruption 
here seems clearly intentional. The fact that these Justices ultimately disa-
gree is not surprising in light of this interaction—arguably both Justices 
were advocating opposing positions, rather than simply asking questions.28 
Another case, Abbott v. Abbott, involved quite different coalitions of 
Justices.29 Abbott concerned an international custody dispute and the ques-
tion was whether a prohibition on a parent removing a child from a country 
without the other parent’s consent confers a “right of custody” within the 
meaning of the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, which 
                                                                                                                           
 27 Id. at 58:55. 
 28 For an exploration of the significance of the justices’ use of such statements, in lieu of 
questions, and the justices’ increasing tendency to engage in advocacy rather than inquiry, see 
Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, The New Oral Argument: Justices as Advocates, 94 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
 29 See generally Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1 (2010). 
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would mean the child must be returned to the country of habitual resi-
dence. 30 The case gave the Court the opportunity to resolve a circuit split: 
the Eleventh Circuit had embraced the position of the petitioner, who ar-
gued that as a statutory matter, the right to determine a child’s place of resi-
dence and to have a direct relationship with the child must include having a 
say in the country in which the child will live, and that the purpose of the 
Convention was to ensure that the courts in the country of the child’s habit-
ual residence should determine custody disputes.31 The Second, Fourth, 
Fifth, and Ninth Circuits had rejected that position, taking a view consistent 
with the respondent that rights of access and visitation are not rights of cus-
tody, and so do not give rise to an obligation to return the child, and that 
doing so could harm or sever rights of custody, for instance if the actual 
custodial parent could not reenter the country.32 The Solicitor General inter-
vened on behalf of the petitioner. 
The majority was authored by Justice Kennedy and joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Alito. The 
majority held that custody rights “include rights relating to the care of the 
person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child’s place 
of residence,” which can be held jointly.33 The majority also reasoned that 
any conclusion to the contrary “would render the Convention meaningless 
in many cases where it is most needed.”34 Justice Stevens wrote the dissent-
ing opinion, joined by Justices Thomas and Breyer. The dissent stressed that 
petitioner “has no authority to decide whether his son undergoes a particular 
medical procedure; whether his son attends a school field trip; whether and 
in what manner his son has a religious upbringing; or whether his son can 
play a videogame before he completes his homework;” as such, he does not 
have “daily care or control over” his son and thus does not have a custody 
right.35 
Once again, Abbott was hard to predict on ideological lines, pairing the 
liberal Justice Stevens and the conservative Justice Thomas against the ide-
ological rainbow coalition of the majority. In addition, the two coalitions 
crossed methodological boundaries, with, for instance, the pragmatic Justice 
Kennedy and the formalist Justice Scalia writing together, and the pragmat-
ic Justices Stevens and Breyer writing with the very formal Justice Thom-
                                                                                                                           
 30 See Abbott, 560 U.S. at 7; Brief for Petitioner at i, Abbott, 560 U.S. 1 (No. 08-645). 
 31 Abbott, 560 U.S. at 7. 
 32 Id.; Brief for Respondent at 11, 13, Abbott, 560 U.S. 1 (No. 08-645). 
 33 Abbott, 560 U.S. at 11 (quoting Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction, art. 5(a), Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89). 
 34 Id. at 13. 
 35 See id. at 23 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the father only had visitation rights). 
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as.36 Analyzing the argument before the holding was announced, SCO-
TUSblog correctly noted that the oral arguments indicated that the “tradi-
tional alignments on the Court” appeared to be breaking down.37 We argue 
that despite the ideological and methodological heterogeneity of the coali-
tions, the outcome was not unpredictable: rather, there were hints about the 
then-future decision available by examining interruptions at the oral argu-
ment. 
Antonin Scalia: Well, if these things were effective-- 
Anthony M. Kennedy: Well, but the ne exeat order-- 
Antonin Scalia: --we wouldn’t -- we wouldn’t have a treaty, 
would we? 
Karl E. Hays: If they-- 
Antonin Scalia: If these local remedies were effective, we 
wouldn’t have a treaty. 
Anthony M. Kennedy: --And I was-- 
Karl E. Hays: --These-- 
Anthony M. Kennedy: --I was going to say the ne exeat order, un-
der your view, is the one order that can’t be enforced anyplace. 
Karl E. Hays: --Now, the – the -- a violation of the ne exeat pro-
vision could be enforced, but the question before this Court is 
whether the means of enforcing the ne exeat provision falls under 
the auspices of the Hague Convention.38 
Justices Scalia and Kennedy interrupted each other despite ultimately 
voting together. These interruptions seem intentional, with each Justice try-
ing to win the floor. Yet these two Justices were the most common inter-
rupters on the Roberts Court, so one might not take as much from it than 
interruptions between other justices.39 All other interruptions in this case 
occurring between pairs of justices who ultimately voted together were 
mere conversational overlaps. One occurred between two justices who are 
ordinarily ideologically opposed, but who both joined the majority in this 
case: 
Antonin Scalia: How many-- 
                                                                                                                           
 36 Id. at 5 (majority opinion); id. at 23 (Stevens, J. dissenting); see Fischman & Jacobi, supra 
note 2, at 1674–75. 
 37 Erin Miller, Divining the Purpose of a Treaty on Child Abduction, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 14, 
2010), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/01/divining-the-purpose-of-a-treaty-on-child-abduction/ 
[http://perma.cc/69YE-8HVT]. 
 38 Oral Argument at 53:25, Abbott, 560 U.S. 1 (No. 08-645), https://www.oyez.org/cases/
2009/08-645. 
 39 Jacobi & Schweers, supra note 4, at 1434. 
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Ruth Bader Ginsburg: You would be on absolutely sound ground 
if this were a convention on the mutual recognition of jurisdiction 
and judgment, but it’s not.40 
Similarly: 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Do you know-- 
John G. Roberts, Jr.: So the woman would be subject to -- if she 
wanted to remain with the child, there would be no protection.41 
Conversational overlaps also occurred between ideological allies who were 
both in the majority: 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg: It’s a provision--  
Sonia Sotomayor: Let’s assume there’s a law that says joint cus-
tody; mom can determine the place to live; mom can determine 
the education of the child; dad can visit when he wants; dad can 
review choices but not veto them.42 
These interruptions do not seem intentional: the vying speech episodes 
are so close in proximity that the Justices are speaking almost at the same 
time. In contrast to these conversational overlaps, which occurred almost 
entirely between coalition members, repeated substantive interruptions oc-
curred between the ideologically diverse coalitions. For instance, both a 
liberal and moderate-conservative majority justice repeatedly interrupted a 
liberal dissenting justice: 
Stephen G. Breyer: Who’s against it? I -- as I read their brief, 
France is not on their side. It’s split. 
Karl E. Hays: --Correct. 
Stephen G. Breyer: Canada is on your side; that the House of 
Lords is -- has some dicta written by two judges, which is good, 
but it wasn’t a holding in the case. 
Karl E. Hays: Correct. 
Stephen G. Breyer: And -- and that’s about it, and so maybe they-- 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg: --You have -- you have a lady-- 
Antonin Scalia: Germany. 
Stephen G. Breyer: --Germany. 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg: --Elizabeth Butler-Sloss in the Court of 
Appeal in England, and that was a square holding. 
                                                                                                                           
 40 Oral Argument at 1:07, Abbott, 560 U.S. 1 (No. 08-645), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2009/
08-645. 
 41 Id. at 8:59. 
 42 Id. at 28:55. 
2274 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2259 
Karl E. Hays: That was -- there -- there have been -- that is one 
instance.43 
Similarly, the argument involved another back and forth between Jus-
tices Kennedy and Breyer. In this instance, Justice Breyer had asked a very 
long question, beginning at the start of the second minute. He then had an 
extensive back and forth with the advocate for the petitioner, Amy Howe, 
for almost two and a half minutes, before the following interaction: 
Sonia Sotomayor: There is an alternative, isn’t there? 
Amy Howe: --There is an alternative. I mean, certainly under 
Chilean-- 
Sonia Sotomayor: For the woman to go to the Chilean court? 
Amy Howe: --Exactly, Justice Sotomayor. Under Chilean law and 
presumably under the law that you’ve hypothesized as well, Jus-
tice Breyer, the woman could go to court and ask for permission 
to leave the country, and that’s precisely what Mrs. Abbott could 
have done in this case. She just never opted to do that. 
Anthony M. Kennedy: Well, suppose you -- suppose you have a-- 
Stephen G. Breyer: That isn’t my question. 
Amy Howe: Okay. 
Stephen G. Breyer: I’m trying to get at what the humane purpose 
would be, given your interpretation of the law in this kind of situ-
ation?44 
The advocate then returned to responding to Justice Breyer’s question. 
So even though the advocate had engaged with Justice Breyer for over two 
minutes, and then another Justice, Sotomayor, had a back and forth with the 
advocate, when a third Justice, Kennedy, began to ask another question, 
Justice Breyer interrupted to draw the advocate back to his question posed 
almost three minutes earlier. For context, note that petitioner’s advocate 
only spoke for sixteen minutes in her primary presentation (twenty includ-
ing her reply), as she was sharing her time with the Solicitor General’s rep-
resentative. 
So, in Abbott there were numerous conversational overlaps among 
those Justices who were eventually in agreement, and substantive interrup-
tions occurred almost exclusively between those in disagreement. Below, 
our results show that the pattern of substantive interruptions occurring be-
tween eventual opponents in the case is not limited to these illustrative ex-
                                                                                                                           
 43 Id. at 48:58. 
 44 Id. at 4:32. 
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amples.45 The remainder of this Article shows that this pattern is systematic 
and statistically significant, and explores a number of complexities associ-
ated with that pattern of substantive interruptions being associated with fu-
ture disagreement. 
B. Relevant Literature 
The Supreme Court is the head of one branch of government, frequent-
ly deciding some of the most controversial and salient policy issues of the 
day, such as the constitutional status of same-sex marriage,46 whether gov-
ernment rules violate the right to free speech,47 and questions of relative 
presidential-congressional power.48 Yet, its process of arriving at decisions 
that shape the law of the land is highly secretive and opaque.49 Unsurpris-
ingly, there is a large body of literature attempting to inferentially determine 
every aspect of that process.50 And yet, even though oral arguments have 
been shown by scholars51 and declared by multiple justices52 to be im-
                                                                                                                           
 45 See, e.g., Oral Argument at 15:44, Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230 (2008) 
(No. 08-305), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2008/08-305: 
Samuel A. Alito, Jr: Well, what happens in the case where-- 
Antonin Scalia: Could the district appeal? That’s the end of the road? Can’t the dis-
trict say the hearing officer is wrong? 
Gary S. Feinerman: Absolutely, the district can appeal. 
 46 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (ruling that the right to marry a member of 
the same sex is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 47 Recent cases include Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412 (2016) (prohibiting 
employees from being fired on the basis of mistaken beliefs about their political views and expres-
sions), and Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017) (prohibiting re-
strictions on communication of different prices of goods). 
 48 Recent cases include National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 
(2014) (ruling that the President cannot deem the Congress to be in recess, contrary to Congress’s 
own determination, and thus cannot make recess appointments in such circumstances), and Zivo-
tofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015) (determining that the President has the power, despite 
congressional legislation to the contrary, to recognize foreign states, including refusal to designate 
Jerusalem as part of Israel for the purposes of passport identification). 
 49 See generally, e.g., BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE 
SUPREME COURT (1979) (conducting a detailed investigation to reveal the inner workings of the 
Court). 
 50 See Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, The Strategic Analysis of Judicial Decisions, 6 ANN. REV. 
L. & SOC. SCI. 341, 342 (2010) (summarizing the extensive literature on judicial decision-
making). 
 51 See Timothy R. Johnson, Paul J. Wahlbeck & James F. Spriggs, II, The Influence of Oral 
Arguments on the U.S. Supreme Court, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 99, 99–100 (2006) (showing that 
the quality of an advocate’s performance at oral argument influences justices’ votes on case out-
comes). 
 52 See, e.g., U.S. COMM’N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., STRUCTURE 
AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE: A PRELIMINARY REPORT 66 
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portant and affect case outcomes,53 an empirical literature on oral arguments 
has only recently begun to develop.54 
In recent years, scholars in both law and political science have begun 
to ask whether and to what extent oral arguments matter, in terms of affect-
ing judicial decision-making and thus the outcome of cases. Prior scholars 
have attempted to answer this question by first addressing at what point in 
cases justices determine their votes (e.g., before or after oral argument) and 
whether oral arguments influence voting or opinion writing. Some existing 
research investigating justices switching votes during the opinion drafting 
process (known as voting fluidity) has found that the justices actually 
change their positions following oral argument.55 While others have ques-
tioned this, failing to find the same result, more scholars have found that 
oral arguments can have multiple consequences, including affecting the case 
opinions.56 
                                                                                                                           
(1975) (“I have had too many occasions when my judgment of a decision has turned on what hap-
pened in oral argument.”) (quoting Justice Brennan); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME 
COURT: HOW IT WAS, HOW IT IS 276–77 (1992) (stating that “if an oral advocate is effective, how 
he presents his position during oral argument will have something to do with how the case comes 
out”); James Iseler, Justice Kagan Shares Supreme Court Insights During Law School Conversa-
tion, U. MICH. REC. UPDATE (Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.ur.umich.edu/update/archives/120910/
kagan [http://perma.cc/C5V2-F36N] (“You can sway people to your side or you can also lose a 
case in the oral arguments.”) (quoting Justice Kagan). 
 53 For arguments to the contrary, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SU-
PREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 280 (2002) (finding no evidence that 
oral arguments “regularly, or even infrequently, determine[] who wins and who loses”); Phillips & 
Carter, supra note 5, at 169 (arguing that the “information-seeking value” of oral arguments has 
diminished since the 1960s and that justices now use oral arguments for speaking, rather than 
asking); Andrew S. Polls, The Death of Inference, 55 B.C. L. REV. 435, 450 (2014) (providing an 
example of a Justice “observing” during oral argument rather than asking a question). 
 54 Non-empirical work on oral argument includes: William Benoit, Attorney Argumentation 
and Supreme Court Opinions, 26 ARGUMENTATION & ADVOC. 22, 34 (1989) (describing an in-
formation gathering benefit to the justices in oral arguments); Timothy R. Johnson, Information, 
Oral Arguments, and Supreme Court Decision Making, 29 AM. POL. RES. 331, 331–33 (2001) 
(same); Stephen L. Wasby, Anthony A. D’Amato & Rosemary Metrailer, The Functions of Oral 
Argument in the U.S. Supreme Court, 62 Q.J. SPEECH 410, 418–20 (1976) (same). 
 55 See, e.g., Eve M. Ringsmuth, Voting Fluidity Throughout the Decision-Making Process on 
the U.S. Supreme Court, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 197, 197 (2015) (finding “support for the notion that 
early fluidity, changing positions from before oral arguments to after, especially when combined 
with major shifts in the majority coalition, can be a bellwether of traditional fluidity”). 
 56 See Phillips & Carter, supra note 5, at 169 (arguing that the “information-seeking value” of 
oral arguments has diminished since the 1960s and that justices now use oral arguments for speak-
ing, rather than asking); SEGAL AND SPAETH, supra note 53, at 280 (finding no evidence that oral 
arguments “regularly, or even infrequently, determine[] who wins and who loses”); see also DA-
VID W. RHODE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 153 (1976) (“Oral 
argument does not, however, provide reliable clues as to how a given justice may vote.”); JEFFREY 
A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 208–09 
(1993) (“The justices aver that it is a valuable source of information about the cases they have 
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For example, one study uses justice voting in previous cases to predict 
a justice’s position going into oral argument, and then uses this predicted 
measure to estimate whether oral arguments change voting.57 It uses the 
positions taken by Justices Blackmun and Powell prior to oral arguments to 
ask whether oral arguments change their votes and find that they switch 
votes only in a minority of cases.58 Another study predicts judicial votes on 
the basis of the emotional content of the justices’ at oral arguments.59 It 
finds that the justices use more unpleasant language towards the attorney 
that ultimately loses on the merits.60 This Article contributes to that discus-
sion: in the conclusion, we argue that our findings of a relationship between 
interruptions at oral argument and disagreement in the ultimate decision 
suggest that oral arguments are important for the justices’ decision-making 
process. 
In addition to assessing the relationship between oral arguments and 
case outcomes, existing literature does find some evidence that oral argu-
ments are important because they provide information to the justices.61 For 
example, Timothy Johnson asks whether justices use oral arguments to seek 
information about cases.62 Using oral arguments and the Court’s majority 
opinions in a sample of cases from the Burger Court era, he finds some evi-
dence that oral arguments are used to gather information.63 
Beyond the value of oral arguments to the justices and the impact of 
oral arguments on their decisions, a growing literature assesses how much 
information oral arguments provide about the justices’ future decisions. This 
                                                                                                                           
agreed to decide, but that does not mean that oral argument regularly, or even infrequently, deter-
mines who wins and who loses.”). But see Benoit, supra note 54, at 34 (describing how justices 
process and react to oral arguments); Donald S. Cohen, Judicial Predictability in United States 
Supreme Court Oral Advocacy: Analysis of the Oral Argument in Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 2 U. 
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 89, 90 (1978) (studying the relationship between justices’ predispositions 
to issues in a case and their actions during its oral argument). 
 57 Johnson et al., supra note 51, at 99–100 (showing that the quality of an advocate’s perfor-
mance at oral argument influences justices’ votes on case outcomes). 
 58 See Eve M. Ringsmuth, Amanda C. Bryan & Timothy R. Johnson, Voting Fluidity and 
Oral Argument on the U.S. Supreme Court, 66 POL. RES. Q. 429, 429 (2013) (finding that Justices 
Powell and Blackmun changed their votes in several cases because of oral arguments). 
 59 Ryan C. Black, Sarah A. Treul, Timothy R. Johnson & Jerry Goldman, Emotions, Oral 
Arguments, and Supreme Court Decision Making, 73 J. POL. 572, 572 (2011) [hereinafter Black et 
al., Emotions and Decision Making]; see also Dietrich et al., supra note 11, at 1 (studying whether 
a judge’s emotional response at oral argument is a predictor of how the judge will vote). 
 60 See Black et al., Emotions and Decision Making, supra note 59, at 572. 
 61 See Benoit, supra note 54, at 34 (describing an information gathering benefit to the justices 
in oral arguments); Johnson, supra note 54, at 331–33 (same); Wasby, D’Amato & Metrailer, 
supra note 54, at 418–20 (same). 
 62 Johnson, supra note 54, at 332–33. 
 63 Id. 331–33. 
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literature attempts to predict the outcome of cases based on elements of oral 
arguments. For example, Bryce J. Dietrich, Ryan D. Enos, and Maya Sen 
use audio recordings of Supreme Court arguments from 1982–2014 to fore-
cast votes based on the emotional arousal of justices at oral argument and 
find strong evidence that arousal of justices is highly predictive of how jus-
tices vote.64 Their study focuses on vocal arousal of the justices and does 
not directly study interruptions. Our Article contributes to this inquiry, 
showing that there is information about likely coalitions in case outcomes 
available to the educated observer of oral arguments in the form of interrup-
tions. 
There is also a literature examining the occurrence of interruptions at 
oral arguments specifically. Barry Sullivan and Megan Canty examine inter-
ruptions at oral arguments from 1958–60 and 2010–12 and find that the jus-
tices interrupt each other more in the 2010–12 terms than in the 1958–60 
terms.65 They show that this is part of a broader trend of greater judicial 
activity, mirroring increases in the number of interruptions of advocates by 
the justices and the amount of time that justices speak at oral arguments.66 
Lawrence Wrightsman provides an anecdotal analysis of a broader range of 
years and empirically assesses the 2003–2006 Terms.67 
Most extant empirical studies of interruptions either cover only cases 
from 2004 (or later) onwards68 or are selective or impressionistic.69 At least 
two comprehensive empirical studies warrant mention. Tonja Jacobi and 
Dylan Schweers assess oral arguments in the 1990, 2002, and 2004–2015 
terms and find a significant gender difference in interruptions at the Roberts 
Court.70 They provide a detailed analysis of the patterns of interruptions at 
                                                                                                                           
 64 Dietrich et al., supra note 11, at 1, 3. 
 65 Barry Sullivan & Megan Canty, Interruptions in Search of a Purpose: Oral Argument in 
the Supreme Court, October Terms 1958–60 and 2010–12, 5 UTAH L. REV. 1005, 1019, 1041 
n.116 (2015). 
 66 Id. at 1019, 1045. 
 67 LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, ORAL ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT: AN EM-
PIRICAL APPROACH 164–65 (2008). 
 68 See generally RYAN C. BLACK, TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON & JUSTIN WEDEKING, ORAL ARGU-
MENTS AND COALITION FORMATION ON THE US SUPREME COURT: A DELIBERATE DIALOGUE 
(2012) (studying Supreme Court justices’ interruptions). There is also an unpublished manuscript by 
Adam Feldman and Rebecca D. Gill. Adam Feldman & Rebecca D. Gill, Echoes from a Gendered 
Court: Examining the Justices’ Interactions During Supreme Court Oral Arguments 42 (Working 
Paper, Jan. 31, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2906136 [http://perma.cc/3CC8-QQVK]. In addi-
tion, Johnson et al., supra note 51, at 99–100, 104, analyze cases from 1970–1994. 
 69 WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 67, at 164–65 (only covering the 2003–2006 terms); Sullivan & 
Canty, supra note 65, at 1035 (only covering oral arguments from 1958–1960 and 2010–2012). 
 70 Jacobi & Schweers, supra note 4, at 1429, 1435. 
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oral argument, but do not test whether interruptions are associated with vot-
ing agreement between justices.71 
Ryan C. Black, Timothy R. Johnson, and Justin Wedeking authored 
another noteworthy empirical assessment of interruptions by assessing oral 
arguments between 1998–2007 and examining justice-to-justice interrup-
tions using a notion of interruptions that is broader than we use.72 In par-
ticular, they define an interruption as having occurred any time two justices 
speak back-to-back without an interjection or answer from an advocate.73 
Because we are interested in isolating the conflict inherent in interruptions 
from other reasons why justices may be interrupting each other, distinguish-
ing between conversational overlaps and substantive interruptions is a better 
approach than defining an interruption as justices speaking back-to-back. 
Our definition excludes interruptions that one might not expect to reflect 
conflict. For instance, it is not uncommon for justices to make statements 
rather than ask a question, and a second justice speaking after such a state-
ment should often not be taken as a conflict between the justices.74 Black et 
al. find that six percent of all utterances by the justices are interruptions of 
other justices under their broader definition—as we will see, this is magni-
tudes higher than the number of interruptions under our definition.75 Using 
the speaking back-to-back definition of interruptions and examining the 681 
cases in the publicly available data, Black et al. identify a number of empir-
ical trends associated with judicial interruptions, including the variation 
among justices’ tendency to interrupt and the tendency of justices who inter-
rupt more to also be interrupted more.76 They explore a number of hypothe-
ses empirically, and find that justices are more likely to be interrupted by 
“ideologically distant colleagues;” that justices who frequently interrupt 
another speaker (including advocates) during oral arguments are more likely 
to be subsequently interrupted by their colleagues later in the proceedings; 
that justices with greater expertise in an area—as measured by the number 
of case opinions written in the area—are more likely to interrupt than other 
justices; and that justices are more likely to interrupt another justice if that 
justice interrupted them earlier in the proceedings.77 They find no evidence 
that speaking more generally is associated with more interruptions—as we 
                                                                                                                           
 71 See Jacobi & Schweers, supra note 4 (analyzing patterns of interruptions at oral argument). 
 72 BLACK ET AL., supra note 68, at 20–21. 
 73 Id. at 21. 
 74 See Jacobi & Sag, supra note 28, at 43, 47–48 (analyzing justices’ use of statements in lieu 
of questions). 
 75 BLACK ET AL., supra note 68, at 25. 
 76 Id. at 29. 
 77 Id. at 29, 41–44. 
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will see, this is not the case under our more specific definition of interrup-
tions.78 
Our study takes a different focus, specifically exploring interruptions 
at oral arguments in order to examine the relationship between apparent 
manifestations of conflict at oral argument and subsequent disagreement in 
voting, as reflected in the final case outcomes. 
We examine agreements and disagreements among justices by looking 
at voting at the justice-pair level. Certain peer effects between judicial col-
leagues have been shown to influence decision-making—through delibera-
tion, group polarization, aversion to dissent, or some other channel.79 To 
this end, myriad literature has documented significant effects of judicial 
peers on judicial decision-making at the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, and 
a recent paper by Richard Holden, Michael Keane, and Matthew Lilley 
finds compelling evidence that peer effects are also meaningful among jus-
tices on the Supreme Court.80 
                                                                                                                           
 78 Id. at 44; see infra notes 113, 121–123 and accompanying text. 
 79 For an analysis of the effect of female judges, see generally Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein 
& Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389 
(2010) (studying the effect of judges’ gender); Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: 
Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759 
(2005) (same). 
 80 Also called “panel effects,” the literature assesses how the preferences of other judges on a 
court affect decision-making, usually by looking at three-judge panels. See Thomas J. Miles & 
Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 
U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 827 (2006) (estimating the effect of the composition of appellate panels in 
applying Chevron deference and finding that “a Democratic appointee, sitting with two Democrat-
ic appointees, is 31.5 percentage points more likely to vote to uphold a liberal decision than a 
conservative one—and a Republican appointee, sitting with two Republican appointees, is over 40 
percentage points more likely to vote to uphold a conservative decision than a liberal one”); Rich-
ard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 
1719 (1997) (concluding that “a judge’s vote (not just the panel outcome) is greatly affected by 
the identity of the other judges sitting on the panel; in fact, the party affiliation of the other judges 
on the panel has a greater bearing on a judge’s vote than his or her own affiliation”); see also 
RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 31–34 (2008) (studying how the preferences of judges 
affect decision-making of other judges on the same court); Richard Holden, Michael Keane & 
Matthew Lilley, Peer Effects on the United States Supreme Court 42 (Working Paper, Feb. 3, 
2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2916394 [http://perma.cc/AU2J-V56E] (finding evidence that the 
ideology of one justice can affect another’s vote). See generally Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. 
Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal 
Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998) (examining the effect of having a potential dissent-
ing voice with a contrary ideological preference on the majority); Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation 
and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 
157 U. PA. L REV. 1319 (2009) (examining the driving mechanisms of panel effects); Cass R. 
Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Ap-
peals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301 (2004) (examining panel effects in multi-
ple different areas). 
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Other studies have used the justice-pair measure of judicial agreement 
to examine different substantive questions, such as coalition stability in 
group or individual decision-making.81 One article that uses pairwise 
agreement to address the question most closely related to our inquiry is by 
Christine Kexel Chabot.82 That study primarily examines the effect of ex-
pert training on individual justice voting, but it also inquires as to the extent 
to which justices of similar legal education voted together.83 
We believe that analysis at the justice-pair level can be a powerful ap-
proach to thinking about how judges vote, particularly for examining the 
relationship between conflict and agreement among justices. To see why, 
consider how judges on a panel reach agreement. Agreement could theoreti-
cally arise automatically from the innate alignment of preferences between 
two judges, in which case a tally of votes could determine the outcome of 
the case. But in the absence of such consensus, persuasion is often required. 
This is particularly the case for the Supreme Court, as it is made up of nine 
people who typically work together for decades. It also has a strong tradi-
tion of joint opinion writing, in contrast to the British tradition of seriatim 
opinions.84 Convincing other justices to sign an opinion necessarily requires 
greater persuasion than when each justice writes alone. That justices actual-
ly engage in a process of judicial persuasion and negotiation is suggested by 
Lee Epstein and Jack Knight’s detailed analysis of memos among the jus-
tices, which finds that extensive persuasion and detailed negotiation is typi-
cally required in order to forge an opinion of the Court.85 
                                                                                                                           
 81 See Melinda Gann Hall, Small Group Influences in the United States Supreme Court, 12 
JUST. SYS. J. 359, 362 (1987) (testing coalition stability among groups of justices by using justice-
pairs as “the most straightforward method of identifying blocs”); S. Sidney Ulmer, Toward a The-
ory of Sub-Group Formation in the United States Supreme Court, 27 J. POL. 133, 144–45 (1965) 
(developing a theory of sub-group formation on the Court using justice-pair agreement as an ad-
mittedly “arbitrary” method to get at the real topic of interest, group voting). 
 82 See Christine Kexel Chabot, Schooling the Supreme Court, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 217, 219 
(2015) (studying how education levels affect how justices vote). 
 83 Id. 
 84 See, e.g., Adam S. Hochschild, Note, The Modern Problem of Supreme Court Plurality 
Decision: Interpretation in Historical Perspective, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 261, 270 (2000) 
(describing how the U.S. tradition of consolidated opinions began under Chief Justice Marshall’s 
reign as part of a determined effort to “abolish[] fractured, seriatim decisions and maintaining 
straightforward precedents”). 
 85 EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9, at 99–106 (examining written memos from Justices lob-
bying their colleagues for changes and negotiating conditions for their joining the opinion, and 
showing the resultant changes in opinions from early drafts until the final opinions). 
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C. The Meaning of Interruptions Between Justices at Oral Argument 
What can we learn about judicial relationships from interruptions be-
tween judges at oral arguments? There is a broad social science literature 
examining patterns in interruption behavior, the causes and effects of inter-
ruptions, and various theories of the purpose of interruptions. This literature 
spans multiple contexts of interruptions, including interruptions in a 
group,86 one-on-one interruptions,87 interruptions in a professional setting,88 
and interruptions in a social setting.89 
The explanation we seek to isolate is the “conflict” theory: interrup-
tions constitute a type of observable conflict that is systematically associat-
ed with disagreement.90 This concept has been more comprehensively ex-
plored outside the judicial literature; other social science studies of interrup-
tions find that interruptions represent expressions of power by the interrupt-
er over the interruptee.91 Furthermore, that literature finds that many inter-
ruptions are attempts by speakers to maximize their power positions in 
group settings through assertions of dominance.92 Interruptions have long 
been recognized as manifestations of both conflict and dominance in the 
psychology literature,93 such that interruptions are now often used as 
measures of dominance.94 
                                                                                                                           
 86 Leonard Karakowsky, Kenneth McBey & Diana L. Miller, Gender, Perceived Competence, 
and Power Displays: Examining Verbal Interruptions in a Group Context, 35 SMALL GROUP RES. 
407, 409 (2004). 
 87 Don Zimmerman & Candace West, Sex Roles, Interruptions and Silences in Conversations, 
in LANGUAGE AND SEX: DIFFERENCE AND DOMINANCE 105, 111–13 (Barrie Thorne & Nancy 
Henley eds., 1975). 
 88 See Lyn Kathlene, Power and Influence in State Legislative Policymaking: The Interaction 
of Gender and Position in Committee Hearing Debates, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 560, 564 (1994) 
(discussing differences between genders in a legislative hearing context). 
 89 See Adrienne B. Hancock & Benjamin A. Rubin, Influence of Communication Partner’s 
Gender on Language, 34 J. LANG. SOC. PSYCHOL. 46, 51 (2014) (studying conversations between 
two individuals concerning either cell phones or reality television). 
 90 But see BLACK ET AL., supra note 68, at 44 (finding interruptions motivated by revenge). 
 91 Jacobi and Schweers also find support for this conclusion. See Jacobi & Schweers, supra 
note 4, at 1478 (noting that interruptions occur between justices with opposing ideologies). 
 92 See, e.g., Julia Goldberg, Interrupting the Discourse on Interruptions: An Analysis in 
Terms of Relationally Neutral, Power and Rapport Oriented Acts, 14 J. PRAGMATICS 883, 883 
(1990) (classifying interruptions as being power driven or neutral displays of rapport). 
 93 See e.g., Amerigo Farina, Patterns of Role Dominance and Conflict in Parents of Schizo-
phrenic Patients, 61 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 31, 31 (1960) (using interruptions to meas-
ure conflict in families of schizophrenics); Theodore Jacob, Patterns of Family Conflict and Dom-
inance as a Function of Child Age and Social Class, 10 DEV. PSYCHOL. 1, 3–4 (1974) (using 
interruptions, as well as talking time and attempted interruptions, to measure dominance and con-
flict patterns in families); Lennard A. Leighton, Gary E. Stollak & Lucy Rau Ferguson, Patterns 
of Communication in Normal and Clinic Families, 36 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 252, 
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One study by Julia Goldberg attempts to break down the association 
between interruptions and dominance more precisely. She finds that there 
are power-driven interruptions—those that attempt to assert dominance—
and non-power, neutral interruptions—those that are not power grabs.95 
Additionally, scholars find that interruptions may be in part a product 
of group level power dynamics, as well as individual level power dynamics. 
In the legislative context, psychologist Lyn Kathlene examines transcripts 
of state legislative committee hearings and finds that an increasing propor-
tion of women in a legislative body increases the extent that men become 
more verbally aggressive through both interrupting and otherwise control-
ling the hearing.96 This study of interruptions is consistent with findings 
that existing constituents in a given situation, including in the boardroom, 
feel threatened by the entry of less traditional members.97 Thus, interrup-
tions look a lot like other dominance behaviors. Accordingly, we may gain 
insight about the nature of judicial relationships and judicial conflict by ex-
amining interruptions in Supreme Court oral arguments. 
One reading of extant findings on interruptions in the context of the 
Supreme Court suggests that conflict is at work. For instance, Black et al. 
find that ideology contributes to the frequency of justice-to-justice interrup-
tions, with justices more likely to interrupt their ideological opponents.98 
Jacobi and Schweers find support for this conclusion and further find that 
these patterns are asymmetric, with conservatives disproportionately inter-
rupting liberals and males disproportionately interrupting females, reflect-
ing the two majority groups of the period studied interrupting the two mi-
nority groups.99 Beyond any conflict that may arise stemming from ideolog-
ical or gender divisions, we seek to examine the relationship between con-
flict (interruptions) and ultimate agreement more broadly. 
The social science literature on interruptions also provides support for 
our distinction between conversational overlaps and substantial interrup-
tions. Starting in the 1930s, the psychology literature initially treated all 
                                                                                                                           
254–55 (1971) (showing an association between both the number of times a person is interrupted 
and interrupting behavior on one hand and conflict in families on the other). 
 94 Nicola Ferguson, Simultaneous Speech, Interruptions and Dominance, 16 BRIT. J. SOC. & 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 295, 301–02 (1977); Jacob, supra note 93, at 3–4.  
 95 Goldberg, supra note 92, at 883. 
 96 Kathlene, supra note 88, at 569. 
 97 See, e.g., AARON A. DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY 53–54 (2015) 
(describing how male directors tend to resist calls for diversification in corporate boardrooms in 
order to protect their status). 
 98 BLACK ET AL., supra note 68, at 41. 
 99 Jacobi & Schweers, supra note 4, at 1478; see also Feldman & Gill, supra note 68, at 61 
(reporting a similar effect regarding gender). 
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overlaps in conversation—all “simultaneous speech”—as interruptions; 
however, according to psychologist Richard J. Watts, psychology research 
improved greatly when scholars realized that some conversational overlaps 
in speech were quite different from others.100 Studies found that there are 
predictable transition points in conversation where overlaps do not have the 
same significance; for example, topic sharing is a sign of mere conversa-
tional overlaps.101 Conversational overlaps are not necessarily considered 
impolite, whereas interruptions typically are, as substantial interruptions 
deprive the speaker of the floor.102 
In summary, there are good reasons to suggest that interruptions be-
tween justices might constitute a type of observable conflict that is system-
atically associated with disagreement. Although a conflict between judges 
leading to interruptions and a breakdown in voting of the coalition is one 
possible explanation of our findings, we must consider other factors that 
could lead to justices interrupting one another. A possible second ‘exposure’ 
explanation for justice-to-justice interruptions is that a justice who consid-
ers a case special might not only be more prone to disagree with other jus-
tices but also be more prone to control the oral argument by speaking more 
or longer in the case. Justices who speak more in a case might be more ex-
posed to interrupting or getting interrupted simply by virtue of taking up 
more time in the oral argument, so the relationship between interruptions 
and disagreement might be driven exclusively through this exposure. 
A third ‘dissatisfaction’ theory is that a justice interrupts because he or 
she is at odds with the rest of the Court about the direction of the oral argu-
ments and the anticipated outcome of the vote, but who that interruption is 
directed against is not important. On this theory, Justice X interrupting Jus-
tice Y in a case is not indicative of Justice X and Y’s unique disagreement 
in the case but of Justice X’s disagreement with the Court in general; the 
point of Justice X’s interruption is that it is occurring in the case by Justice 
X, and Justice Y’s identity is unimportant. This may occur, for example, if 
the case is very salient to the individual justice, but is not particularly sali-
ent to the rest of the Court. 
                                                                                                                           
 100 See WATTS, supra note 6, at 67–70 (describing the history of psychology research on in-
terpretations, the effect of the over-inclusive approach, and the development of different catego-
ries of interruptions). 
 101 Id. at 70. 
 102 Id. at 73. The research also shows other meaningful differences within the category of 
simultaneous speech: in particular, unsuccessful interruptions are significantly less associated with 
dominance than successful interruptions. See Derek B. Roger & Andrea Schumacher, Effects of 
Individual Differences on Dyadic Conversational Strategies, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSY-
CHOL. 700, 704–05 (1983) (showing that high and low dominance predispositions predicted the 
rate of successful interruptions but not of unsuccessful interruptions). 
2018] Judicial Conflicts and Voting Agreement 2285 
A fourth ‘difficult-case’ theory for interruptions and voting disagree-
ment is that a given justice is interrupting not because of something else 
related to the justice they interrupt or because they are at odds with the rest 
of the Court but because of some reflection of the case that is common to all 
justices. Then, Justice X interrupting Justice Y in a case is not indicative of 
Justices X and Y’s disagreement in the case, or of Justice X being at odds 
with the rest of the Court in general, but rather of the case itself. In fact, 
Justice X’s interruption could have been done by Justice Z and the interrup-
tion could have been of a justice other than Y; the point of the interruption is 
that it is occurring in the case by some justice. The difference between the 
dissatisfaction and difficult-case explanations is that in the difficult-cases, 
the interruption is not specific to either of the justices involved in the inter-
ruption but is simply a response to the nature of the case itself. There are 
innumerable possible aspects of cases that can make a case difficult in this 
way and cannot be individually controlled for, such as unusual fact patterns, 
disagreement among the justices as to whether certiorari should have been 
granted, peculiar circuit splits, etc. In the remainder of this Article, we ex-
amine the relationship between interruptions and disagreement, and test 
these four explanations of that relationship. 
II. DATA 
Our empirical analysis uses data from the words spoken at oral argu-
ments of Supreme Court cases and justices’ subsequent votes. The data for 
justice votes comes from the Spaeth Supreme Court Database, which con-
tains information on how individual Supreme Court justices voted on cases 
and case information (e.g., issue of the case) for those decided between 
1960 and 2015.103 The unit of analysis in the Supreme Court Database is the 
justice-vote. We create a dataset where the unit of analysis is the case-
justice-pair and define the main outcome of interest as whether the justice-
pair voted together in the case (taking a value of one if the justices voted in 
the same direction and a value of zero if the justices did not vote in the 
same direction). For most cases in which nine justices vote, there are thirty-
six justice-pair observations. For cases with eight and seven justices, there 
are twenty-eight and twenty-one justice-pairs, respectively. 
                                                                                                                           
 103 Harold J. Spaeth et al., 2016 Supreme Court Database Code Book: Version 2016 Release 01, 
at 35 (2016), http://supremecourtdatabase.org/_brickFiles/2016_01/SCDB_2016_01_codebook.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/MF49-K4WY] (describing the criteria for the identification of issues); Harold J. 
Spaeth et al., Supreme Court Database: Version 2015 Release 01, WASH. U. L. (2015), http://
supremecourtdatabase.org/data.php?s=2 [http://perma.cc/J48C-HJ8B] (using “Justice Centered 
Data” and “Cases Organized by Docket” database). 
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We match these case-justice-pair outcomes to interruptions between 
the justice-pair in the corresponding case from a dataset we built based on 
information from the Oyez project. Oyez is a multimedia archive of Su-
preme Court cases that contains all words spoken during Supreme Court 
oral arguments.104 It has a webpage for each case and archives the full tran-
script of the oral argument for every argument since 1960, among other re-
sources.105 The transcript webpage is presented in the order in which words 
are spoken. Each time a new speaker begins to speak, the webpage identi-
fies the speaker and then follows with the words spoken until the next 
speaker begins. The format is similar to the official oral argument tran-
scripts for cases from 2004 to 2016 that the Supreme Court makes publicly 
available.106 The official transcripts have been used in prior research.107 But 
whereas the official transcripts are only available from 2004 onwards, the 
Oyez project’s transcripts begin in 1960.108 
We scraped the Oyez website for the text of words spoken in each Su-
preme Court case since 1960—that is, we ran an automated program that 
obtained all of the oral argument transcripts on the website.109 The complete 
                                                                                                                           
 104 OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/ [http://perma.cc/H8R3-V45M]. 
 105 See generally, e.g., Oral Argument, Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 
1257 (2015) (No. 13-895), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-895. 
 106 Compare Oral Argument, Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, supra note 105, with Oral Argu-
ment, Perry v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017) (No. 16-399), https://www.supreme
court.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcript/2016 [http://perma.cc/GZ3H-MNJV] (both formats 
organizing the transcript in the same fashion).  
 107 See, e.g., BLACK ET AL., supra note 68, at 14 (relying on official transcripts); WRIGHTSMAN, 
supra note 67, at 80–83, 86 (same); Feldman and Gill, supra note 68, at 37–40 (same); Jacobi & 
Schweers, supra note 4, at 1405 (same). 
 108 One limitation of the Oyez site is that the written record of the words spoken at oral argu-
ments are based on the Court’s audio recordings. Even though Oyez has made significant progress 
in identifying each speaker, there are some remaining gaps. Some elements are missing in the 
data. In particular, in some speech episodes, speakers are not identified. This is apparent because 
speech episodes are defined but the place where the name of the speaker is usually provided is 
simply empty. This is in the underlying HTML files that we used to generate the data, not simply 
in our version of the data. The large majority of missing elements was fixed by Oyez between 
January 2017 and July 2017. The first round of our web scraping ran from January 3, 2017 to 
January 8, 2017. To be conservative, we reran the analyses after excluding all cases in which (1) 
there was a speech episode of a justice that was interrupted and no speaker was identified, and (2) 
a justice interrupted a speech episode but no speaker of the interrupted speech episode was identi-
fied. The results and general patterns do not materially change if we keep the cases with interrup-
tions but simply ignore the missing speakers. 
 109 As pointed out in Bryce J. Dietrich, Ryan D. Enos & Maya Sen, Supporting Information 
(to go online) for: Emotional Arousal Predicts Voting on the Supreme Court 2 n.2 (forthcoming 
2018), https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/msen/files/scotus-audio-si.pdf [https://perma.cc/UY6P-
Z9V2], Oyez dramatically changed its website sometime between September 6, 2015, and October 
12, 2015. They report that the old version of the website contained much less aggressive web 
scraping barriers. Dietrich et al. scraped an older version of the website on July 1, 2015. Id. 
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web scraping ran in July 2017.110 From these files, we created a dataset and 
formatted the data such that each observation is a unique “speech episode” 
of a speaker at oral argument. A speech episode consists of all words spoken 
between the time a justice or an advocate begins to speak and the time the 
next speaker begins to speak. For each speech episode, the Oyez interface 
offers “transcript-synchronized and searchable audio.”111 The synchronized 
interface operates by highlighting the text of the words of a speech episode 
that is being played through the audio output. Figure 1 depicts an example 
of the graphical user interface of the Oyez transcript-synchronized audio 
recording system.112 
Figure 1: Graphical User Interface (GUI) of Oyez Transcript-Synchronized 
Audio Recordings 
 
Figure 1 shows the highlighted text as the interface plays the audio 
file. When the speaker begins a new sentence, the highlighted text moves 
onto the next sentence. Our definition of a speech episode is not defined by 
sentences, but rather by the speaking time between one person starting to 
speak and another person subsequently starting to speak. As such, a speech 
episode contains multiple intervals of the interface. For example, the speech 
                                                                                                                           
 110 We also scraped data in January 2017, but it was less complete than the July 2017 data, as 
Oyez had not yet fixed the missing data problem, and it did not contain the second half of the 2017 
Supreme Court Term. See OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/about [http://perma.cc/F3AN-8DG7]. 
 111 Id. 
 112 In the event that this version of the Article does not display tabular or graphical material, 
please refer to an alternative version, such as is available on SSRN or Boston College Law Review; 
links are currently available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=3039105 and https://lawdigitalcommons.
bc.edu/bclr/vol59/iss7/3/. 
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episode for E. Joshua Rosenkranz in Figure 1 would begin with the words 
“Your Honor” and end with the words “the violation of --of--.” 
For the interface to highlight the relevant words that are being played 
through the audio, the webpage feeds the timing of the words spoken in the 
audio file into JavaScript. The underlying file that creates the webpage that 
we scraped contains the time stamps of each highlighted text (to the 0.001 
of a second) in which the words spoken begin and end. We utilize these 
time stamps to create the time stamp of each speech episode. As discussed 
below, these time stamps are critical to our empirical analysis because they 
will be used to distinguish between interruptions that are meaningful and 
mere conversational overlaps. 
The underlying files from Oyez identify an interruption with the use of 
either two dashes (--) at the end of a speech episode of the speaker being 
interrupted or two dashes at the beginning of a speech episode of the inter-
rupting speaker, or both. This coding is also used in the official transcripts 
of Supreme Court oral arguments. Figure 1 also provides an example of an 
interruption. There, the two dashes at the end of Rosenkranz’s speech epi-
sode were immediately followed by a speech episode of Justice Kagan; this 
indicates that Justice Kagan interrupted Rosenkranz, at least as coded in the 
transcripts. 
The two dash coding of interruptions is a useful starting point to iden-
tifying interruptions. We now discuss a refinement of the definition of an 
interruption to address the situation when two people start talking at about 
the same time and one stops to yield to the other. This type of speech dis-
ruption is not a meaningful breach in the course of conversation that one 
should identify as an “interruption.” We expect the two dash coding of in-
terruptions to fail to distinguish between meaningful interruptions, where 
the interrupter continues to speak after the interruption, and non-meaningful 
“conversational overlaps,” when two people begin speaking at around the 
same time. Using the time stamp of speech episodes, we define meaningful 
interruptions in two ways. First, we use the time stamps of the interruptions 
to refine the definition of an interruption where the interrupter continues to 
speak for more than one second. As an example, consider Justice Kagan’s 
interruption in Figure 1. Justice Kagan interrupted Rosenkranz and then 
spoke for more than one second. We believe this is a meaningful interrup-
tion because Justice Kagan appears to have completed her thought. Note 
that we experimented with different thresholds for the amount of time (e.g., 
0.5 second, 1.5 seconds) and found similar results. 
As a second refinement, we use the timing of the previous speech epi-
sode. In Figure 1, Rosenkranz had been speaking for more than one second 
before Justice Kagan interrupted. We believe that the Rosenkranz’s speech 
episode in Figure 1 is clearly substantial, and so Justice Kagan’s interrup-
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tion was a substantive interruption. For our definition of a substantive inter-
ruption, we require that the person who was interrupted to have been speak-
ing for at least one second before the time stamp of the beginning of the 
next person’s speech episode. We define overlaps in speech that last for less 
than these times as conversational overlaps and separate them from mean-
ingful interruptions. Once again, we experimented with different thresholds 
for the amount of time and find similar results.113 In Part V, we investigate 
differences between substantial interruptions and conversational overlaps.114 
Conversational overlaps are common; a typical example arises in 
Birchfield v. North Dakota, as shown in Figure 2.115 In this example, Justic-
es Sotomayor and Breyer began speaking almost simultaneously; although 
Justice Sotomayor spoke first, Justice Breyer had probably begun speaking 
before realizing that Justice Sotomayor had already spoken two words. Jus-
tice Breyer’s words appear not to be a substantive interruption, but rather a 
simple conversational overlap. 
Figure 2: Example of Non-Meaningful Interruptions 
 
From these Oyez data on speech episodes, we identify interruptions 
according to the above definitions, along with the identities of the interrupt-
                                                                                                                           
 113 We also experimented with defining a meaningful interruption using the number of words 
spoken in a speech episode (requiring the interrupted speech to be at least two words and requiring 
the interruption speech to be at least two words). We also experimented with the number of words 
used for the refinement (e.g., three words, four words). The conversational overlaps we found 
using the word count largely overlapped with the conversational overlaps we found using the time 
stamps. 
 114 See infra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 115 Oral Argument at 41:05, Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) (No. 15-068), 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-1468. 
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er and interruptee. For each case, we then calculate the number of interrup-
tions between each justice-pair. 
III. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: INTERRUPTIONS, EXPOSURE,  
AND GENERAL TENDENCIES 
This Part presents descriptive statistics of interruptions and justice-pair 
voting patterns. In Section III.A, we assess the extent that interruptions are 
related to exposure to being interrupted.116 In Section III.B, we present de-
scriptive evidence on voting and interruptions between judicial pairs. In 
Section III.C, we assess differences in interruptions and voting by justices 
and by justice-pairs.117 
A. Interruptions and Exposure 
A justice who speaks frequently or lengthily might have a higher like-
lihood of interrupting or being interrupted, even without increased levels of 
conflict. Additionally, speaking more in a case may signal a justice’s greater 
tendency to disagree with the other justices in the case more generally. If 
interruptions are related to justices’ airtime, it would be possible to observe 
a relationship between interruptions and disagreement driven exclusively by 
variation in speaking time unrelated to conflict. As such, it will be important 
to control for the exposure to being interrupted. 
We measure exposure in three different ways: (1) the time spent speak-
ing, which is calculated from the time stamps of each speech episode, (2) 
the number of sentence breaks, and (3) the number of words spoken, which 
is calculated from the transcripts. Here, we assess the relationship between 
these exposure measures and interruptions. Figure 3 plots a standard binned 
scatter plot of the relationship between each of the exposure measures and 
interruptions.118 To create the figure, we create twenty equal sized groups of 
case-justice-pairs for each of the exposure measures, and calculate the aver-
age number of interruptions for each bin. Figure 3 shows a strong relation-
ship between the exposure measures and interruptions. Given that another 
measure of justice interruptions—any time two justices speak back-to-back 
without an interjection or answer from an advocate—was found to be unre-
lated to exposure, Figure 3 provides some evidence that our definition of 
                                                                                                                           
 116 See infra notes 118–119 and accompanying text. 
 117 See infra notes 120 and accompanying text. 
 118 A binned scatter plot is a way of representing data in a more summary form than a com-
plete scatter plot, which can be difficult to interpret when there is a high number of observations. 
A binned scatter plot groups the x-axis into equal sized bins, making it easier to observe overall 
patterns. 
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interruption is different than the previously used definition in at least one 
way: the more a justice talks, the more likely he or she will interrupt or be 
interrupt-ed.119 Figure 3 also shows that each of the exposure measures ap-
pears to be equally related to interruptions. Below, we use the words spoken 
as our measure of exposure, but find consistent results using the other 
measures as well. 
Figure 3: Relationship Between Exposure Measures and Interruptions 
B. Voting and Interruptions by Justice-Pair 
The main question this Article seeks to answer is whether interruptions 
between justices in a case are related to voting in that case. A different and 
more general question is whether justices who disagree more generally are 
generally more likely to interrupt each other. To assess this more general 
relationship, we calculate the percent of cases with interruptions and the 
percent of cases in voting agreement for each justice-pair. Panels A and B of 
Figure 4 plot the distribution for interruptions and voting, respectively. 
In terms of interruptions, Panel 4A shows that the average justice-pair 
interrupts each other in one percent of cases but the distribution is skewed 
to the right. Whereas twenty-six percent of justice-pairs have never inter-
rupted each other and another ten percent of justice-pairs interrupt each oth-
                                                                                                                           
 119 BLACK ET AL., supra note 68, at 20–21. 
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er less than one time per five hundred cases, fifteen percent of justice-pairs 
interrupt each other in at least three percent of cases. Now referring to Panel 
4B, the average justice-pair votes in agreement in sixty percent of cases.  
To assess the relationship between general voting agreement and inter-
ruptions at the justice-pair level, Figure 5 reports a binned scatterplot and a 
line of best fit, where the proportion of cases with interruptions between the 
justice-pair is on the x-axis and the proportion of cases with voting agree-
ment between the justice-pair is on the y-axis.  Figure 5 provides no evi-
dence of an overall relationship between justices who vote together and in-
terruptions between the justices in all cases. This suggests that any relation-
ship between justice-pair agreement and interruptions is not driven by a 
general tendency to disagree or a general tendency to interrupt. 
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Figure 4: Distribution of Interruptions and Voting Agreement  
at the Justice-Pair Level  
 A. Interruptions 
 
B. Voting Agreement 
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Figure 5: General Voting Agreement and Interruptions  
at the Justice-Pair Level 
 
C. Interruptions and Voting by Justice and Justice-Pairs 
The relationship between interruptions and voting agreement in a case 
could be idiosyncratic to the justices. For example, Justice Scalia might in-
terrupt someone often, but that might be less reflective of whether he is go-
ing to vote against that justice than the same behavior by another justice 
because Justice Scalia has been thought by some to be a disruptive jus-
tice.120 To assess the relationship between interruptions and voting at the 
justice level, we first calculate the difference in voting agreement between 
cases with and without an interruption. For example, Justice Scalia and Jus-
                                                                                                                           
 120 Justice Scalia is often described as being especially disruptive, and even having been the 
catalyst for the phenomenon of common interruptions on the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Nina 
Totenberg, Justice Antonin Scalia, Known for Biting Dissents, Dies At 79, NPR (Feb. 13, 2016), 
http://www.npr.org/2016/02/13/140647230/justice-antonin-scalia-known-for-biting-dissents-dies-
at-79 [http://perma.cc/VN4V-97ZK] (“When [Justice Scalia] came to the Court, the justices asked 
few questions during oral argument. [He] jumped in, pummeling lawyers relentlessly with ques-
tions. Soon other justices took a more active approach to questioning, so that most lawyers could 
get less than a sentence out of their mouths before being interrupted.”). But see Jacobi & 
Schweers, supra note 4, at 1430 (showing that Justice Scalia is not the most disruptive justice on 
the Supreme Court, but rather comes in second behind Justice Kennedy and just ahead of Chief 
Justice Rehnquist). 
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tice Stevens voted together in thirty-four percent of cases where one inter-
rupted the other and forty-one percent of cases where one did not interrupt 
the other. The difference in voting agreement between cases with and with-
out an interruption for these justices is seven percentage points. 
In Figure 6, we plot the average difference in voting agreement in cas-
es with and without an interruption for each justice on a line. Only four Jus-
tices, Justices Blackmun, Whitaker, Warren, and Breyer, lie to the left of the 
origin, meaning that they disagree more in cases without interruptions be-
tween themselves and another justice than they do in cases where one of the 
justices interrupted the other justice at least once. All other Justices to have 
served on the Court since 1960 are more likely to disagree in cases where at 
least one interruption occurred between the Justices. This provides prelimi-
nary evidence of a negative relationship between interruptions and agree-
ment. 
Figure 6: Differences in Disagreement for Cases with and Without Interruptions 
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IV. RESULTS: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERRUPTIONS AND VOTING 
A. Testing the Four Theories of Interruptions 
To estimate the relationship between justice-pair interruptions and dis-
agreement in a case, we regress whether a justice-pair voted together in a 
case on the number of interruptions between them in the case. Equation (1) 
sets out our main econometric specification: 
𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜓𝜓𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜃𝜃𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖    (1) 
 
where 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an indicator for whether justice-pair i voted together on 
case c in Term t, where justice-pair i is made of up justice j and j’. As de-
scribed in more detail below, Eict is the exposure of justices to being inter-
rupted measured by the proportion of justice words spoken by the justice-
pair, 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the total number of the justice j interruptions in the case, 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is 
the total number of justice interruptions in the case, 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 are term fixed ef-
fects, 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are issue area fixed effects, and 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 are justice-pair fixed effects.  
 In the most sophisticated models that we do not report, we enrich 
the model by replacing justice-pair fixed effects with justice-pair-Term 
fixed effects, thus comparing the likelihood of a justice-pair to vote together 
in cases in which they do not interrupt one another in a given Term to like-
lihood of the justice-pair to vote together in cases in which they do interrupt 
one another in the same Term. Justice-pair fixed effects are important to our 
approach because they net out differences in the propensity for two judges 
to vote with each other. The main coefficient of interest, 𝛽𝛽, is on the varia-
ble I, which indicates the number of interruptions between the justice-pair 
in the case. We estimate Equation (1) using a linear probability model. Fol-
lowing the clustering approach with paired data in the international trade 
literature and the networks literature, we cluster at the justice-pair level.121 
Table 1 provides the results. In Column 1, we only control for differences in 
disagreement between terms and issue areas. Relative to the sixty percent 
baseline agreement in cases, the point estimate of -0.045 in Column 1 sug-
gests that justices who interrupt each other in cases are eight percent less 
likely to agree in those cases. Column 1 can be thought of as the average 
relationship between interruptions and voting across all justice-pairs, and 
not how interruptions change the relative likelihood that a justice-pair votes 
together. Column 2 adds controls for differences in overall agreement be-
tween each justice-pair through justice-pair fixed effects. Justice-pair fixed 
effects control for the average difference in disagreement between each jus-
                                                                                                                           
 121 See Battaglini & Patacchini, supra note 8, at 20; Chilton & Posner, supra note 8, at 22. 
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tice pair, implying that Column 2 estimates the average change in the likeli-
hood that a justice-pair votes in agreement for cases with interruptions be-
tween the justice-pair. The resulting point estimate is slightly reduced to -
0.038, and the precision of the estimate is increased (the standard errors 
decreased from 0.014 in Column 1 to 0.008 in Column 2). The overall di-
rection, magnitude, and significance of the effect remains: interruptions are 
associated with disagreement and the relationship is substantially and statis-
tically significant. 
Table 1: Relationship Between Interruptions and Voting 
 
Voted in Agreement  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Justice-Pair Interruptions  -0.045***  -0.038***  -0.026*** -0.008  -0.026**  
 
 (0.014)  (0.008)  (0.008) (0.009)  (0.010) 
Proportion of Words       -0.038***  -0.025***  -0.025*** 
Spoken by Justice-Pair   
 
 (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Total Interruptions of    
 
   0.000 -0.001 
Justice-Pair in Case       (0.005) (0.005) 
Total Justice    
 
   -0.008***  -0.009*** 
Interruptions in Case       (0.001) (0.001) 
Proportion of Words    
 
   -0.007***  -0.007*** 
Spoken in Case by Justices          (0.002)  (0.002) 
Justice-Pair Interruptions  
     × Total Justice   
 
  0.005**  
Interruptions in Case         (0.002) 
Covariates       
   Term FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Issue Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Justice-Pair FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 196,626 196,626 196,626 196,626 196,626 
Voted in Agreement 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.600 
      Note: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the justice-pair level. * p<0.1, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Proportion of words spoken is multiplied by 10.   
Above, we discussed several explanations for why justices who inter-
rupt each other in a case might be less likely to vote together. Our theory is 
that interruptions are a type of observable conflict, and conflict is systemat-
ically associated with disagreement. To isolate the conflict channel from 
other explanations, we now examine three other possibilities. 
Column 3 explores the exposure theory—that disagreement is higher 
because justices involved with an interruption speak more in the case. We 
have already seen in Figure 3 that interruptions are more likely to occur be-
tween justices in cases where they speak more; as such, the effect of inter-
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ruptions on disagreement could simply reflect the relationship between time 
spent speaking and disagreement. We account for this possibility by control-
ling for the relative speaking time of the justices in the case. In Column 3, 
we find a strong relationship between justice-pair speaking time and disa-
greement: a ten percentage point increase in the time a pair of justices spend 
speaking decreases the likelihood of their agreement by 5.3 percentage 
points. The point estimate on interruptions between justice-pairs is de-
creased to -0.026, but remains statistically significant. The results suggest 
that although almost half of the effect of interruptions on disagreement is 
explained by time spent speaking, the effect of interruptions on disagree-
ment remains substantively meaningful and statistically significant. 
Column 4 examines the dissatisfaction theory of interruptions—that an 
interrupting justice is interrupting because he or she is at odds with the rest 
of the Court. To do so, we add a variable for the total number of interrup-
tions of the justice-pair in the case, labeled “Total Interruptions of Justice-
Pair in Case.” We find no evidence that interruptions of a justice in the case 
are reflective of the interrupting justices’ disagreement with other justices in 
the case: the coefficients are consistently zero or close to zero and do not 
approach statistical significance. 
Column 4 also explores the difficult-case theory of interruptions—that 
interruptions are simply a reflection of something idiosyncratic about the 
case generally that is common to all justices. To do so, we add a variable for 
the number of total interruptions in the case by any justice in the case, la-
beled “Total Justice Interruptions in Case.” Similar to the exposure story 
about specific justices interrupting each other, more justice interruptions in 
a case generally could simply reflect that the justices are collectively speak-
ing more in a case relative to the time the advocates spend speaking in the 
case. As such, we also control for the proportion of words spoken in the 
case by the justices (i.e., words spoken by justices divided by words spoken 
by both justices and advocates), labeled “Proportion of Words Spoken in 
Case by Justices.” 
We find strong evidence that interruptions in a case by any justice is 
significantly related to disagreement in the case. The point estimate of -
0.008 on total justice interruptions in a case indicates that each justice inter-
ruption is related to a decrease in overall agreement between the justice-
pairs of the pair-wise Court overall by 1.3 percent (-0.008/0.600). Note that 
this is in addition to the effect of interruptions between the justice-pair, the 
effect of a specific justice interrupting in a case generally, and the issue in 
the case. Also note that the results are not highly sensitive to the inclusion 
of the proportion of the words spoken in the case by the justices, the issue 
area fixed effects, or other controls. We also find evidence that the relative 
balance of justices and advocates speaking in the case is related to disagree-
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ment in the case. The point estimate of -0.007 on proportion of words spoken 
in a case by justices suggests that a ten percentage point increase in the pro-
portion of the words spoken by the justices collectively in the case decreases 
overall agreement between the justice-pairs by 1.2 percent (-0.007/ 0.600). 
The effect of interruptions between a justice-pair on disagreement of 
the pair in Column 4 is decreased by one-third compared to Column 3 and 
is no longer statistically significant. This is perhaps not surprising because 
Column 4 constitutes a very hard test: the variation that identifies the effect 
of total interruptions of the justice-pair in the case and the effect of total 
justice interruptions in the case also identifies the effect of justice-pair inter-
ruptions.  
Perhaps more importantly, the specification assumes that the effect of 
interruptions between a justice-pair is independent from the effect of inter-
ruptions in the case overall. As discussed above, one might expect the effect 
of an interruption in a case in which other justices are also interrupting to be 
different than an interruption in a case in which it is the only interruption. 
We relax this assumption in Column 5 by including an interaction term be-
tween justice-pair interruptions and total justice interruptions in the case. 
The point estimates in Column 5 are also displayed graphically in Figure 7 
(the vertical bars on each effect show the ninety percent confidence inter-
vals—i.e., we can say with ninety percent confidence that the true effect lies 
within the estimated range of values). 
The results in Column 5 and displayed in Figure 7 help explain why 
the estimates in Column 4 of Table 1 are statistically insignificant. The posi-
tive interaction term suggests that interruptions between justices in a case 
where there are more interruptions between other justices have a smaller 
effect on disagreement. The main effect on interruptions in Column 5 is 
consistent with that in Column 3 and is again statistically significant. This 
suggests that interruptions between justices are predictive of their disa-
greement in cases, but less so in cases with other justice interruptions than 
in cases without other justice interruptions. In both Columns 3 and 5, the 
main result suggests that the probability that a justice-pair votes together 
decreases by 2.6 percentage points for each interruption. This implies that, 
from a baseline of voting together in sixty percent of cases, an interruption 
decreases the probability of voting together by (0.026/0.60=) 4.3%. Overall, 
these results provide evidence that the conflict inherent in interruptions 
even after controlling for the exposure to being interrupted and a proxy for 
a difficult case, which are both independently associated with less voting 
agreement. 
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Figure 7: Competing Theories for the Relationship Between Interruptions 
and Agreement 
 
Overall, these results provide strong evidence that a justice-pair is less 
likely to vote together because of the conflict inherent in interruptions, but 
that the conflict inherent in interruptions is lower in cases where there are 
more interruptions between other justices. We also unearthed evidence for 
the exposure and difficult-case theories of interruptions, but no evidence for 
the dissatisfaction theory. 
Figure 8 provides another graphical illustration of the regression re-
sults. The figure plots the average agreement between justices in cases by 
the number of interruptions in the cases. The first short-dashed line with 
circle markers provides the raw average agreement rate. In cases with no 
interruptions between two justices, the justices vote together sixty percent 
of the time. This rate of agreement decreases by five percentage points in 
cases where there is one interruption between the justice-pair, by nine per-
centage points in cases where there are two interruptions between the jus-
tice-pair, and by thirteen percentage points in cases where there are three or 
more interruptions between the justice-pair. The figure also allows us to 
assess whether the relationship between interruptions and disagreement is 
linear (as assumed in the regressions in Table 1). It provides evidence that 
the relationship is roughly linear. 
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Figure 8: Graphical Relationship between Interruptions and Agreement 
 
The numbers in the first line are the average agreement rates across all 
justice-pairs and cases, and not how interruptions change the relative likeli-
hood that a justice-pair votes together. The second line—the long dash line 
with triangle markers—shows the average change in the likelihood that a 
justice-pair votes in agreement for cases with interruptions between the jus-
tice-pair.122 After controlling for differences in agreement between justice-
pairs, the relationship between interruptions and disagreement is dampened 
compared to the overall average, but the relationship is still very strong. 
Compared to cases where a justice-pair has no interruptions, the justices are 
on average four percentage points less likely to vote with each other if there 
is one interruption, six percentage points if there are two interruptions, and 
eight percentage points if there are three or more interruptions. 
These average changes in the second line are for the overall relation-
ship between interruptions and agreement. Employing a similar strategy to 
isolate the conflict theory from Table 1 from other causes of interruptions, 
the third line captures the agreement rate over justice-pair interruptions that 
                                                                                                                           
 122 To construct the figure, we regress agreement on justice-pair fixed effects, obtain residu-
als, and calculate the average residual for justice-pair-cases with one, two, and three or more inter-
ruptions. We then add the average agreement with no interruptions back to these numbers so that 
they can be compared to the averages. This is a common way to visualize a relationship between 
two variables after controlling for other variables. 
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we attribute to the conflict explanation—the solid line with square markers. 
Compared to cases where a justice-pair had no interruptions, and after con-
trolling for other theories to explain interruptions, the conflict inherent in 
interruptions suggests that a justice-pair is on average one percentage point 
less likely to vote with each other if there is one interruption, two percent-
age points if there are two interruptions, and three percentage points if there 
are three or more interruptions.123 
B. Heterogeneous Effects 
This section investigates whether the relationship between interrup-
tions and voting differs across different justices and different types of cases. 
To study these heterogeneous effects, we re-estimate the regression in Col-
umn 3 of Table 1 above, now including interaction terms between interrup-
tions and various justice and case attributes. 
We first investigate whether the relationship between interruptions and 
voting differs across the justices. There are reasons to suspect that various 
characteristics of the justices themselves could make the relationship be-
tween interruptions and agreement vary. First, the nature of the conflict hy-
pothesis is one of relationships between the justices; this could reasonably 
be expected to change over time, as the justices get to know one another, 
learn each other’s idiosyncrasies, develop friendships or animosities, and 
come to anticipate each other’s likely stances on issues, and thus their ex-
pected agreement or disagreement in eventual outcomes. This relationship 
aspect need not be confined to the two justices having served together on 
Supreme Court: relationships started when two justices served together on 
prior courts could have similar effects. Additionally, the length of each jus-
tice’s experience, and the difference between the pair, could be significant 
because a small but significant seniority norm has been shown to affect in-
terruptions on the Court.124 
Second, we might expect differences with the median justices in terms 
of ideology because he or she is often the swing justice in a case. As dis-
cussed, many studies in the empirical judicial behavior literature find a 
strong effect of ideology on judicial voting, as well as an effect of the ideol-
ogy of other judges on a panel.125 In recent years, this understanding has led 
to even public commentators recognizing the special position of the median 
                                                                                                                           
 123 This series is estimated in the same fashion as the second plotted line but with the addition 
of other control variables from Column 3 of Table 1. 
 124 Jacobi & Schweers, supra note 4, at 1483. 
 125 See supra notes 46–85 and accompanying text. 
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justice on the Court.126 Not only does this lead to different expectations for 
the median, but some Court medians have been more powerful than others, 
depending on the ideological clustering or dispersion of other justices 
around the center of the Court.127 As such, we might expect not only the 
median to behave differently, but this could potentially be true for other jus-
tices close to the median. 
Third, like seniority, gender has also been shown to affect interruptions 
at Supreme Court oral arguments: Jacobi and Schweers showed that the fe-
male justices are three times as likely to be interrupted as the male justic-
es.128 So we might expect the ideology and the gender of the justices to be a 
significant factor. 
To test the consistency of the negative relationship between interrup-
tions and agreement between the justices in light of these possibilities, we 
estimate whether the relationship varies across seven judge attributes: same 
political party (Column 1); the length of time served together (Column 2); 
former colleagues, as measured by whether the justices served together on a 
circuit court of appeals at the same time (Column 3); whether one of the 
justices is the swing justice in the Term (Column 4); whether one of the jus-
tices is one of the middle three swing justices in the Term (Column 5); dif-
ference in experience (Column 6); and same gender (Column 7). 
                                                                                                                           
 126 The power of the median voter has been recognized for decades—DUNCAN BLACK, THE 
THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS, at xxxii (1958); Duncan Black, On the Rationale of 
Group Decision Making, 56 J. POL. ECON. 23, 28 (1948)—but only entered the popular con-
sciousness in relation to the Supreme Court in recent years, a natural consequence of the Court 
press coming to appreciate the import of the large empirical judicial literature showing the effect 
of ideology on the Court. See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. REV. 
37, 40 (2008) (studying the power of the median voter in the Supreme Court); Aaron Blake, Re-
publicans Just Quietly Got Some Very Good Supreme Court News, WASH. POST (July 3, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/07/03/republicans-just-quietly-got-some-
very-good-supreme-court-news/?utm_term=.c2d939674993 [http://perma.cc/V44T-TE3R] (“Here’s 
how the Supreme Court looked between 1935 and 2015 . . . . Keep an eye on that yellow line for 
the median justice, and imagine it being John G. Roberts Jr. instead of Kennedy.”); Alicia Par-
lapiano & Margot Sanger Katz, A Supreme Court with Merrick Garland Would Be the Most Lib-
eral in Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/02/18/
upshot/potential-for-the-most-liberal-supreme-court-in-decades.html [http://perma.cc/3SJ8-7MZZ] 
(tracking the ideology of the Court over time, specifying the position of the Court median, and 
showing how if Merrick Garland had been appointed to the Court, Justice Breyer would have 
become the new median, making the overall Court considerably more liberal). 
 127 Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 126, at 47. 
 128 Jacobi & Schweers, supra note 4, at 1465–66. This disproportionate effect held true for 
both interruptions by other justices and interruptions by male advocates. Id. In contrast, female 
advocates interrupted at a rate of approximately zero, regardless of the gender of the justice. Id. at 
1466. 
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For political party of the justice, we use the common measure of jus-
tice ideology of the party of the appointing president.129 For the swing jus-
tice in the Term and the three middlemost justices, we use Martin-Quinn 
scores in the relevant Term, a commonly used measure of judicial ideolo-
gy.130 For difference in experience, we use the absolute value of the differ-
ence in years’ experience between each justice-pair. Table 2 presents the 
results. Note that the main effect of time-invariant justice attributes is ab-
sorbed by the justice-pair effects.  
We find no evidence that the same political party, the swing justice, the 
three middlemost justices, difference in experience, and different gender 
significantly alter the nature of the relationship between interruptions and 
disagreement—the coefficient on interruptions remains highly statistically 
significant and of a consistent direction and magnitude. Swing justice is the 
only variable that is significant other than interruptions; however, the inter-
action between the swing justice and interruptions is not significant, so 
while the swing justice is significantly related to disagreement, being the 
swing justice does not change the relationship between interrupting and dis-
agreement.  
There is some evidence of a differential effect over the course of serv-
ing on the bench together. The point estimate of 0.021 for the interaction 
between length of service together and interruptions in Column 2 does not 
quite reach statistical significance at conventional levels, but it is very 
close. Moreover, the main effect of interruptions almost doubles when we 
allow the effect to change over the course of the time justices serve togeth-
er. Combined, this suggests that interruptions between justices who serve 
together longer are less indicative of a conflict between them than are inter-
ruptions that occur earlier in the time they serve together. 
  
                                                                                                                           
 129 This is a dichotomous variable, defined according to whether the president who nominated 
the justice was Republican or Democrat. There are well known examples of justices who were 
great disappointments to presidents—Republican President Eisenhower is reported to have called 
the liberal Chief Justice Earl Warren one of his two greatest presidential mistakes. See Ed Lazarus, 
Four Enduring Myths About Supreme Court Nominees, TIME (May 26, 2009), http://content.time.
com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1900851_1900850_1900845,00.html [http://perma.cc/
WC3E-A4FD] (reporting this claim but explaining it as a product of a knowing political deal, 
rather than as a surprise to Eisenhower). Nonetheless, the party of the appointing president has 
been shown to be a strong predictor of judicial behavior, albeit with less nuance than continuous 
scores. See Matthew Sag, Tonja Jacobi & Maxim Sytch, Ideology and Exceptionalism in Intellec-
tual Property: An Empirical Study, 97 CAL. L. REV. 801, 838 (2009) (showing that the party of the 
appointing president proxy was consistent with the commonly used Martin-Quinn continuous 
scores of judicial ideology, although the latter did absorb the full explanatory power of the former 
when both measures were used). 
 130 See Martin & Quinn, Martin-Quinn Scores, supra note 1. 
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Table 2: Differential Relationships Between Interruptions and Voting  
by Justice Attributes 
 
Voted in Agreement  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Interruptions   -0.025**   -0.072**   -0.027***  -0.029***  -0.031**   -0.024*   -0.023**  
 
 (0.010)  (0.033)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.009) 
Interruptions  -0.005             
× Same Political Party  (0.016)             
ln(Years Served Together)   -0.003           
 
  (0.011)           
Interruptions × ln(Years     0.021           
Served Together)    (0.014)           
Interruptions × Served       0.004         
Together on Circuit      (0.005)         
Swing Justice         -0.014**        
 
       (0.006)       
Interruptions          0.016       
× Swing Justice         (0.021)       
Middle Three Justices          -0.009     
 
        (0.007)      
Interruptions           0.007     
× Middle Three Justices          (0.018)     
Interruptions            -0.004   
× Difference in Experience            (0.014)   
Interruptions              -0.014 
× Different Gender              (0.019) 
        Note: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the justice-pair level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
C. Salient and Important Cases 
We next explore whether the relationship between interruptions and 
voting differs by the salience or the importance of the case. Interruptions 
might mean something different when the legal or political stakes are very 
high in a case than they would for more mundane fact patterns or less con-
troversial topics where the Court might expect less public scrutiny. To ex-
plore this, we use a proxy for salience developed in Epstein and Segal of 
whether a case is mentioned on the front page of the New York Times.131 
This captures the salience of the case in terms of the level of public interest. 
It is possible, however, that a case might be salient to justices and the legal 
community but not to the public. To capture this second notion of salience, 
                                                                                                                           
 131 See Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 66, 72 
(2000) (relying on whether a case is mentioned on the front page of the New York Times as a 
proxy for salience). 
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we also use a measure of whether a case is published in the Congressional 
Quarterly.132 This measure “is based on experts’ retroactive assessment of 
whether a case was a landmark decision,” and captures the legal signifi-
cance of the case. Scholars have used both measures as proxies for im-
portant Supreme Court cases.133 
Before turning to the results, note that justices interrupt each other in 
1.9% of cases that are not covered in the New York Times but interrupt in 
2.5% of cases covered in the New York Times, and that justices interrupt 
each other in 1.9% of cases that are not in the list of Congressional Quar-
terly’s legally important cases but interrupt in 3.2% of cases that are in the 
list of legally important cases. These summary statistics suggest that justices 
interrupt more in cases that are salient, either politically or legally, or both. 
Table 3 reports the results for publicly salient cases (Column 1) and legally 
important cases (Column 2).  
We find that average justice-pair agreement is 15.9 and 22.5 percent-
age points lower in politically salient and legally important cases, but find 
no strong evidence that the relationship between interruptions and voting 
differs for politically salient and legally important cases. Note, however, 
that the size of the point estimate on interruptions in Column (1) decreases 
to -0.016 and that we lose statistical significance at conventional levels. 
This appears to be driven by the interaction term between interruptions and 
a case’s appearance in the New York Times, which is of the same size as the 
main effect. Taking the point estimates at face value, this would suggest 
justice-pairs are 3.2 percentage points less like to agree when one interrupts 
the other in a case cited in the New York Times and 1.6 percentage points 
less likely to agree when one interrupts the other in a case not cited by the 
New York Times. 
  
                                                                                                                           
 132 See, e.g., James H. Fowler, Timothy R. Johnson, James F. Spriggs, II, Sangick Jeon & 
Paul J. Wahlbeck, Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring the Legal Importance of Precedents 
at the U.S. Supreme Court, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 324, 326, 343 (2007) (constructing a network of 
Supreme Court majority opinions and the cases they cite from 1791 to 2005 and dynamic rankings 
that can be used to predict the future citation behavior of state courts, courts of appeals, and the 
Supreme Court); Adam Bonica, Adam Chilton, Jacobi Goldin, Kyle Rozema & Maya Sen, Legal 
Rasputins? Law Clerk Influence on Voting at the U.S. Supreme Court, J.L. ECON. & ORG. (forth-
coming 2018) (manuscript at 17–18) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2815545) (using a case’s appearance in the New York Times or Congressional Quar-
terly to determine whether it is a “high profile” case). 
 133 See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
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Table 3: Differential Relationships between Interruptions and Voting by 
Case Salience and Legal Importance 
 
Voted in Agreement  
 
   (1)     (2) 
Interruptions  -0.016  -0.023**  
 
(0.012)  (0.011) 
New York Times   -0.159***   
 
 (0.007)   
Interruptions  -0.016   
× New York Times  (0.027)   
Congressional Quarterly    -0.225*** 
 
   (0.012) 
Interruptions      0.016 
× Congressional Quarterly     (0.029) 
   Note: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the justice-
pair level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
V. PLACEBO TESTS 
A. Substantial Interruptions and Conversational Overlaps 
Above, we described a refinement of the definition of an interruption. 
The purpose was to distinguish between a substantial interruption, which 
we expect to express conflict and be associated with disagreement in voting, 
and a mere overlap in two justices speaking (“conversational overlaps”), 
which we do not expect to express conflict and be associated with disa-
greement in voting. The time stamps for each speech episode from the Oyez 
data help us to make this distinction empirically. Although our main interest 
is in substantial interruptions, assessing the relationship between conversa-
tional overlaps and voting agreement can help give context to the relation-
ship between substantial interruptions and voting. Assessing whether con-
versational overlaps are related to disagreement serves as a type of placebo 
test: if conversational overlaps are predictive of disagreement, such a rela-
tionship may call into question the credibility of the conflict explanation for 
the substantial interruptions and voting relationship because we do not ex-
pect that conversational overlaps are reflective of conflict. 
In this section, we assess the relative predictive power of substantial 
interruptions and conversational overlaps. To do so, we re-estimate Table 1 
but also include equivalent variables for the number of conversational over-
laps. We also include the same set of substantial interruptions, which allows 
us to assess whether there is a relationship between conversational overlaps 
and voting in addition to the relationship between substantial interruptions 
and voting. Table 4 reports the results. 
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There are three main findings in Table 4. First, comparing Tables 1 and 
4, the relationship between substantial interruptions and voting is not affect-
ed by the inclusion of conversational overlaps. The point estimates on sub-
stantial interruptions in each of the columns in Table 4 are largely un-
changed from those in Table 1. 
Second, there is no evidence of a relationship between conversational 
overlaps and voting. In each column, the point estimate on conversational 
overlaps is small relative to the point estimate on substantial interruptions. 
Third, total conversational overlap interruptions in a case—i.e., all 
conversational overlaps among all justices, not just the relevant justice-
pair—are associated with decreases in voting agreement between justices in 
the case. In other words, justices are more likely to be in disagreement 
when other justices in the case are more likely to begin speaking at the same 
time. 
Combined, the results suggest that although conversational overlaps do 
not reflect conflict between the interrupting and interrupted justices, they do 
reflect something about cases in which justices are more likely to disagree. 
So, we could imagine a case that prompts a lot of spirited talking, resulting 
in a lot of conversational overlaps, but not necessarily reflecting conflict 
between the interrupter and the interruptee. 
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Table 4: Relationship Between Voting Agreement and both Substantial In-
terruptions and Conversational Overlaps 
 
Voted in Agreement  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Justice-Pair Interruptions   
         Substantial Interruptions -0.044*** -0.037***  -0.026*** -0.009  -0.027**  
 
(0.013) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.009)  (0.010) 
     Conversational Overlaps -0.005 -0.009   -0.007  0.003  -0.003 
 
(0.009) (0.007)  (0.007) (0.008)  (0.011) 
 
Total Interruptions of Justice-Pair in Case   
         Substantial Interruptions        0.001  0.000 
 
      (0.005) (0.005) 
     Conversational Overlaps        -0.001 -0.001 
 
      (0.004) (0.004) 
 
 
Total Justice Interruptions in Case  
         Substantial Interruptions        -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 
       (0.001) (0.001) 
     Conversational Overlaps         -0.003*** -0.004*** 
 
       (0.001) (0.001) 
Justice-Pair Interruptions × Total  
    Interruptions of Justice-Pair in Case   
         Substantial Interruptions          0.005*** 
 
        (0.002) 
     Conversational Overlaps           0.001 
 
        (0.001) 
Proportion of All Words       -0.053***  -0.025***  -0.025*** 
in Case by this Justice-Pair       (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Proportion of Words         -0.007***  -0.007*** 
Spoken in Case by Justices         (0.002)  (0.002) 
Covariates       
   Term FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Issue Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Justice-Pair FE  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      Observations  196,626 196,626 196,626 196,626 196,626 
Voted in Agreement  0.600 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.600 
      Note: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the justice-pair level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. Proportion of words spoken is multiplied by 10.    
B. Interruptions at Other Oral Arguments 
Next, we explore the possibility that the relationship between interrup-
tions and disagreement is driven by a more general conflict between justices 
rather than conflict directed at the case in question in the spirit we have in 
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mind. It might even be possible that short term inter-justice animosity in a 
day, week, or month could affect how the justices subsequently vote. For 
example, most arguments are heard on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednes-
days, and the justices vote at conference on those cases on the Friday fol-
lowing oral argument. It is possible that one case in the week could create 
animosity between two justices and that animosity could carry over to other 
cases heard that week. Any carry-over animosity could influence both how 
justices treat each other at oral arguments (whether they interrupt) and 
whether the justices vote together. For example, if a justice strategically 
votes in case A to influence how other justices vote in case B, there could be 
conflict between justices in one case resulting from another case. In that 
scenario, the fact that we see two justices interrupting each other and voting 
against each other in a case could simply reflect a conflict between them on 
the day of the oral argument that is unrelated to conflict between the justices 
in that case. We seek to rule out this possibility. 
The Supreme Court Database includes the date of each oral argu-
ment.134 For this placebo test, we assess whether interruptions between jus-
tices in other oral arguments in the same day or in the same week predict 
voting disagreement. Using the date of the oral arguments, we calculate the 
number of interruptions between each justice-pair that occurred on the day 
and in the calendar week. We estimate the effect of all interruptions on dis-
agreement in the cases that day or week. Table 5 provides the results. Col-
umn 1 includes all interruptions the same day as the oral argument, Column 
2 includes all interruptions in the same week as the oral argument, and Col-
umn 3 includes both the interruptions in the same day and same week. Table 
5 provides no evidence of a relationship between other justice interruptions 
in the same day or week and voting agreement, which provides some evi-
dence that the conflict between justices is limited to the case in question. 
Moreover, controlling for other interruptions does not affect the relationship 
between interruptions in the case and disagreement in the case. 
  
                                                                                                                           
 134 The Supreme Court Database also includes the date of any rehearing. See supra note 103 
and accompanying text. 
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Table 5: Relationship Between Interruptions at Other Oral Arguments  
and Voting Agreement 
        
 
Voted in Agreement  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Justice-Pair Interruptions   -0.038***   -0.039***   -0.038*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Interruptions in Other  0.010 
 
0.010 
Arguments that Day (0.006) 
 
(0.008) 
Interruptions in Other 0.003 -0.000 
Arguments that Week (0.004)  (0.005) 
Covariates     
 Judge Dyad FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Term FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Issue Area FE  Yes Yes Yes 
    Observations  195,596 195,596 195,596 
Voted in Agreement 0.600 0.600 0.600 
    Note: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the justice-pair level. * 
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
        
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This Article asked whether interruptions at oral arguments are related 
to eventual judicial disagreement in the case. Using data on the interrup-
tions between justices in cases from 1960 to 2015, we found that on average 
a judicial pair is seven percent less likely to vote together in a case for each 
interruption that occurs between the judicial pair in the case at oral argu-
ment. Our main contribution was to develop competing theories driving the 
relationship and shed empirical light on the different theories. The particular 
theory that we expected would shed most light on judicial relationships was 
the conflict theory: that interruptions constitute a type of observable conflict 
that is systematically associated with disagreement. Through a condition-
ing-on-observables research design, we isolated the conflict theory from an 
exposure theory (justices who speak more in a case might be more exposed 
to interrupting or being interrupted), a dissatisfaction theory (an interrupting 
justice is interrupting because he or she is at odds with the rest of the Court 
about the direction of the oral arguments and the anticipated outcome of the 
vote), and a difficult-case theory (that interruptions are simply a reflection 
of the case generally that is common to all justices, where cases with more 
disagreement are more prone to have more interruptions). 
We found strong evidence that the conflict inherent in interruptions 
explains over half of the relationship between interruptions and disagree-
ment: even after accounting for the exposure, dissatisfaction, and difficult-
case theories, the probability that a justice-pair votes together decreases by 
four percent for each interruption. We also found some evidence for both 
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the exposure and the difficult-case theories, but not for the dissatisfaction 
theory. 
These results fit with some anecdotal evidence. For example, in Whole 
Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, a dispute that gained national attention prior 
to the oral argument and was expected to be both controversial and poten-
tially significant in its policy impact,135 there were a very large number of 
interruptions.136 But while those interruptions between justices could have 
signaled conflict, and so been predictive of disagreement, the case could 
also be idiosyncratic because of its enormous salience and significance. In 
that oral argument, the female justices spoke disproportionately often, per-
haps out of a strong personal interest in a case of such importance for wom-
en’s rights.137 But with all three of the female justices being liberal,138 and 
eventually voting together, interruptions between them are more likely to be 
the result of fervent agreement and desire by each to ask the killer question, 
rather than a sign of conflict between them, even when those interruptions 
were not mere conversational overlaps. This suggests that it is important to 
take into account characteristics of the cases, such as salience, as well as 
other characteristics, including those of the justices, as the next section 
does. 
A. Implications 
The results contain three important broader lessons. First, they add to 
our understanding of what interruptions mean at oral arguments—that is, 
they are informative about an aspect of judicial behavior. Second, the re-
                                                                                                                           
 135 See, e.g., Amy Howe, Justices Enter the Fray with Grant in Texas Abortion Case: In Plain 
English, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/11/justices-enter-the-
fray-with-grants-in-texas-abortion-case-in-plain-english/ [https://perma.cc/832T-EMPG] (observ-
ing that “today the Justices stepped back into the abortion wars in a big way” in accepting the 
petition for certiorari). See generally Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 
(2016). 
 136 See Oral Argument, Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (No. 15-274), https://www.oyez.org/
cases/2015/15-274. 
 137 See, e.g., Nancy Northup, Sneaking Around the Constitution: Pretextual Health Laws and 
the Future of Roe v. Wade, 26 HEALTH MATRIX 1 (2016) (describing the dangers to women’s 
equality rights of pretextual health laws regulating abortions); Catherine Gamper, Note, A Chill 
Wind Blows: Undue Burden in the Wake of Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 76 MD. L. 
REV. 792, 793 (2017) (arguing that as a result of the case and expected Supreme Court nomina-
tions, in the future “laws that regulate an individual’s access to abortions will likely survive the 
undue burden test while those laws that restrict an abortion provider’s provision of abortions will 
likely fail”). 
 138 In the 2015 Term, Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, and Kagan had Martin-Quinn scores of 
ideology of -2.94, -2.65, and -1.54, respectively, making them approximately 1.50, 1.35, and 0.79 
standard deviations (1.95) to the left of the overall Court that Term. Martin & Quinn, Martin-
Quinn Scores, supra note 1. 
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sults provide a new tool for predicting future voting behavior. Third, the 
results aid our understanding of the role of oral arguments—that is, they 
elucidate an aspect of judicial decision-making, particularly the debate in 
the literature about whether oral arguments are important and add to the 
evidence that oral arguments do matter.139 
In terms of what interruptions mean in the context of oral arguments, 
we found evidence that oral arguments represent expressions of conflict. 
This is consistent with the broad social science literature showing that inter-
ruptions constitute a form of conflict and dominance behavior in a variety 
of contexts ranging from the workplace to the household.140 Regardless of 
the direction of causality, we have shown that interruptions are associated 
with disagreement. Even if justices make voting decisions in a case prior to 
the oral argument, the fact that oral argument comes before voting implies 
that our results provide new information about what will happen in a Su-
preme Court case prior to the conference where justices’ votes takes place. 
This gives us more information than just a justice’s general tendency to vote 
in a particular way based on justice-level attributes like ideology; it gives us 
case-specific information for pairs of justices. 
Our finding that interruptions and disagreement are associated might 
shed light on the significance of oral arguments. As discussed, numerous 
justices have declared that oral arguments are important to them and have 
influenced the way they vote, and scholars have shown that this is a predict-
able and significant effect.141 Yet, other justices deny oral arguments are 
important and other scholars find no evidence that they are important.142 
Our results provide support for the claim that oral arguments do matter. 
Even without knowing the direction of causation between interruptions 
and voting agreement, we can conclude that oral arguments matter, at least 
to the justices, by considering both possible directions of causality. If inter-
ruptions cause disagreement, then oral arguments clearly matter: a conflict 
between two justices at oral arguments perpetuates further conflict in the 
form of two justices failing to agree in the ultimate decision of the case. Ac-
cordingly, inter-judicial behavior at oral arguments itself can shape the law. 
If disagreement causes interruptions, the situation is more complicated. 
If disagreement exists prior to the oral argument taking place, then arguably 
cases have already been effectively determined prior to oral argument and 
                                                                                                                           
 139 See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text. 
 140 See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text. 
 141 See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.  
 142 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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oral arguments are just a form of theater.143 Even if causation runs in this 
direction, however, it does not necessarily follow that oral arguments are 
unimportant. To see why, consider four possibilities of how disagreement 
could cause interruptions. 
Suppose Justice A interrupts Justice B at oral argument. If disagree-
ment leads to interruptions, then not only must Justice A have already made 
up his or her mind, but Justice A expects to disagree with Justice B. One 
explanation is that Justice A expects to disagree with Justice B due to Jus-
tice B’s general ideological or methodological tendency, but still believes 
that Justice B’s vote is malleable. Justice A interrupts Justice B to influence 
Justice B’s vote, which would imply that we are only partly in the reverse 
direction of causality scenario: at least some justices perceive the votes of 
other justices to not be predetermined, and oral arguments still matter in 
terms of shaping case votes. 
A second explanation is that every justice has already decided how he 
or she is going to vote and expects every other justice to have similarly al-
ready made their decision. Justice A might nonetheless interrupt Justice B 
because Justice A is attempting to shape the way that Justice B approaches 
the question and the formation of his or her reasoning in the eventual opin-
ion. This second explanation would imply that oral arguments still matter: 
they do not matter in terms of changing votes, but they matter in terms of 
shaping doctrine. 
The third and fourth explanations both involve scenarios where every 
justice has already decided on their vote and every justice has already de-
cided on the reasoning. Why, then, are justices interrupting their expected 
adversaries in the case? A third explanation is that the justices are grand-
standing. Then, oral arguments may indeed be a dog and pony show; never-
theless, the conclusion that oral arguments do not matter still does not fol-
low. If the justices grandstand during oral argument, performing for the at-
tendant public and the broader public through the Court reporters, then that 
tells us that oral arguments matter, just in a different way. The justices must 
at least care about how oral arguments are perceived. Even if oral arguments 
do not influence case votes or how the opinion is written, the grandstanding 
explanation would imply that oral arguments nonetheless shape judicial be-
havior. It also might suggest that the justices believe that perceptions of oral 
arguments contribute towards the legitimacy of the Court, which an exten-
                                                                                                                           
 143 It is theoretically possible that justices come to oral arguments with an open mind and 
make a decision during the oral argument but prior to interrupting another justice, but this is likely 
uncommon due to the short period of time involved. 
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sive literature has in turn shown to be central to judicial power144 in part 
because the judiciary has neither the power of the sword nor the purse. 145 
The fourth and final possibility is that justices are not grandstanding 
but simply cannot stop themselves from interrupting. This final theory is a 
behavioral explanation: that interrupting justices have self-control problems 
that overcome their self-restraint to wait for a place in the conversation. Yet 
we have shown that interrupting justices are not randomly interrupting but 
rather are interrupting other justices in cases in which they are more likely 
than usual to disagree. Accordingly, the lack of self-control means either (1) 
that interrupting justices care about oral arguments enough to systematically 
interrupt colleagues with whom they expect to disagree, or (2) that justices 
are particularly unable to control themselves from interrupting when they 
are prone to disagree with a colleague. The Justices regularly profess that 
the latter is not the case: that their disagreements over issues of law create 
no personal animus whatsoever. 146 As such, the only explanation under 
which oral arguments do not matter is if the justices have been consistently 
misrepresenting their own personal responses to disagreement. Otherwise, 
                                                                                                                           
 144 See, e.g., Stephen G. Breyer, Liberty, Prosperity and a Strong Judicial Institution, 61 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 5–6 (1998) (equating judicial power to judicial independence); Steven 
Lubet, Judicial Discipline and Judicial Independence, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 59, 67 (1998) 
(examining how judicial independence allows state and federal courts to act as intended); Peter M. 
Shane, Interbranch Accountability in State Government and Constitutional Requirement of Judi-
cial Independence, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21, 24 (1998) (discussing the ramifications if judi-
cial independence is lost). 
 145 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 146 See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Statements from the Supreme Court Regarding the Death 
of Justice Antonin Scalia (Feb. 15, 2016), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/press
releases/pr_02-14-16 [http://perma.cc/3EQT-3LMJ] (describing her ideological opponent, Justice 
Scalia, as her “best buddy”); Max Greenwood, Ginsburg: Trump Supreme Court Nominee Neil Gor-
such Is ‘very easy to get along with,’ THE HILL (Feb. 23, 2017), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-
briefing-room/news/320950-ruth-bader-ginsburg-neil-gorsuch-is-very-easy-to-get-along-with [http://
perma.cc/2GAC-TH2E] (describing Justice Gorsuch as “very easy to get along with” despite their 
ideological differences); Lloyd Grove, Supreme Court Justices Defend Thomas, Bush v. Gore at 
Aspen Ideas Festival, DAILY BEAST (June 29, 2011), http://www.thedailybeast.com/supreme-
court-justices-defend-thomas-bush-v-gore-at-aspen-ideas-festival [http://perma.cc/MHP9-6Z8Z] 
(describing Justice Breyer and Justice O’Connor defending Justice Thomas, and summarizing as 
“membership on the Supreme Court apparently trumps ideology and politics when it comes to 
defending an embattled colleague”); Samantha Guzman, Stephen Breyer on How the Supreme 
Court Justices Get Along, KERA NEWS (Dec. 13, 2016), http://keranews.org/post/stephen-breyer-
how-supreme-court-justices-get-along [http://perma.cc/35VT-4RTA] (“We’re in a world where 
we have to work together over a long period of time to do our job . . . . I’ve never heard a voice 
raised in anger in that conference room no matter how outrageous I think the other position is . . . . 
I’ve never heard a voice say of another person anything insulting or rude. Just doesn’t happen.”) 
(quoting Justice Breyer); Pat Vaughan Tremmel, Kagan Talks About Life on the Supreme Court, 
NW. NOW (Feb. 5, 2015), https://news.northwestern.edu/stories/2015/02/kagan-talks-about-life-
on-the-supreme-court [http://perma.cc/G786-TG6Q] (describing an interview in which Justice 
Kagan said that the Justices get along very well despite different views on cases). 
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under all other explanations, oral arguments have significance, at least to 
the justices. 
So, ambiguity may still exist as to the extent of the importance of oral 
arguments as well as of the mechanism of their impact, but this line of rea-
soning suggests it is harder to argue that oral arguments are meaningless. 
B. Potential Future Research 
We feel there are at least two important avenues for future research. 
The first potential avenue would be to attempt to isolate the direction of 
causality. We have established a relationship between conflict (interrup-
tions) and agreement (voting together), but not which causes which. Alt-
hough it might be very difficult or impossible to identify a credible research 
design to isolate the direction of causality, we feel that further efforts to un-
derstand the justices’ goals of oral arguments—e.g., the extent to which jus-
tices use oral arguments to gather information, to signal to their colleagues 
the strength of their beliefs, or as attempts to influence their colleagues—
can help shed light on whether interruptions cause or simply reflect the 
eventual disagreement. 
The second potential avenue for future research relates to differences 
in the meaning of interruptions. We have only begun the process of under-
standing differences in the meaning of interruptions by distinguishing be-
tween meaningful interruptions and mere conversational overlaps. We con-
sider it quite possible that the relationship between interruptions and agree-
ment could be reversed for some types of interruptions. For example, there 
could be a positive relationship between interruptions and agreement in cas-
es where the interruption occurs when the justice is trying to help a specific 
side or justice. In some oral arguments, some of the justices come to the 
argument favoring one side and seemingly wanting to see that side do well. 
This was explicitly acknowledged in a case in the 2016 Term, Dean v. Unit-
ed States.147 After Justice Sotomayor had repeatedly asked petitioner’s ad-
vocate, Alan G. Stoler, questions that appeared directed at helping him 
make a persuasive argument, Stoler confused Justice Sotomayor and Justice 
Kagan. Justice Kagan responded by saying “She’s Justice Sotomayor . . . . 
She was the one helping you.”148 This is an unusually frank recognition by a 
justice of a perhaps not uncommon phenomena, and it is one that is not lim-
ited to the justices helping the advocates. Although establishing a way to 
quantify “helpful” interruptions was beyond the scope of this Article, we 
                                                                                                                           
 147 See generally Dean v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1170 (2017). 
 148 Oral Argument at 6:39, Dean, 137 S. Ct. 1170 (No. 15-9260), https://www.oyez.org/
cases/2016/15-9260. 
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believe that this is a meaningful distinction that is worthy of further investi-
gation.
   
 
